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A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law:
Taking on the Technicalities
ANNELISE RILESI-
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Rediscovering the Technicalities
The legal academy currently consists of roughly two
groups, two kinds of scholars, two sets of questions and
concerns. On the one hand are the constitutional theorists,
the legal historians, the law and society scholars, the
jurisprudes and legal philosophers, the literary theorists,
the feminists, the anthropologists, the critical race scholars.
On the other are the economists, the political scientists, the
doctrinalists, the cognitive scientists, the corporate lawyers.
We could call them the Culturalists and the Instrumental-
ists.
How do these two tribes divide up the world? The
culturalists generally treat law as the embodiment of
norms, the outcome of political compromise, and the reposi-
tory of social meanings. For them, the task of legal scholar-
ship should be to provide an account of the content of legal
norms, the meaning of legal texts, or the place of law in
culture.1 The instrumentalists, in contrast, view law in
t Professor of Law and Professor of Anthropology, Cornell Law School. For
comments, criticism, and assistance of many kinds, I thank Bruce Ackerman,
Lea Brilmayer, Bill Eskridge, Paul Kahn, David Kennedy, Harold Koh, Hiro
Miyazaki, Kunal Parker, Vicki Schultz, Gary Simson, and Bert Westbrook.
1. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, Twentieth-Century Legal Metaphors for Self and
Society, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY (Austin Sarat et al., eds., 2002);
MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994); PETER FITZPATRICK,
THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body.-
A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 395-96 (1992) (querying "the assumptions
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primarily pragmatic instrumental terms, as a tool to be
judged by its successes or failures in achieving stated ends.
2
For them, just as law is a means to an end, scholarship
about the law should be evaluated as a means to an end: it
should declare its uses and effects in the very design of its
questions, and it should be evaluated according to its
usefulness in solving actual legal problems.
3
Of course feminists can also be cognitive scientists and
doctrinalists can be jurisprudes, and literary theorists can
care about devising useful solutions to concrete legal
problems-indeed few legal scholars would define them-
selves solely in cultural or instrumental terms. But the
premise of this Essay is that at the core of this tribal
dispute is a surprising fact. Both groups have quite
impoverished understanding of the very thing that defines
our field, of what makes law as opposed to literature or
economics or cognitive science: the technicalities of legal
thought.
To the culturalist, the technical dimensions of law are a
mundane and inherently uninteresting dimension of the
law, the realm of practice rather than theory. He or she
may also feel that the obsessive focus on law as a tool
makes it difficult to talk about other, important questions.
As James Boyd White put it long ago:
Law then becomes reducible to two features: policy choices and
techniques of their implementation. Our questions are 'What do
we want?' and 'How do we get it?' In this way the conception of law
as a set of rules merges with the conception of law as a set of
institutions and processes. The overriding metaphor is that of the
about the proper roles of men and women" at stake in state laws that compel
pregnancy).
2. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAw AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). Susan Rose-
Ackerman, for example, has proposed a technical and yet pragmatic role for
judicial scrutiny of legislative decisions: "The courts would not engage in policy
analysis when they review statutes, but they would insist that the legislators
both articulate a set of purposes and consider the relationship between means
and ends." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Comment, Progressive Law and Economics-
And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 352 (1988).
3. As Richard Posner has put it, cost-benefit analysis, which he describes as
an up to date version of means-ends reasoning, is valuable because it "compels
the decision maker to confront the costs of a proposed course of action." RICHARD
A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 105, 107, 123-24 (2001).
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machine; the overriding value is that of efficiency, conceived of as
the attainment of certain ends with the smallest possible costs.
4
To the instrumentalist, in contrast, the technical details
of doctrine are interesting only insofar as they are relevant
to what lawyers sometimes term "building a better
mousetrap." They do not become the subject of any deeper
or more critical inquiry. Consider, for example, John
Merryman's definition of law: "Like other machines, the law
machine is designed to perform work-in this case, legal
work-in response to instructions. The operator of the
machine supplies the appropriate instruction and the
machine, if properly designed and powered, performs it."
5
This Essay is a manifesto for the Culturalists in all of
us. It argues that it is a mistake for Culturalists to ignore
the technical aspects of legal thought for a number of
reasons. First, any approach to the law that ignores what is
the very core of legal thought cannot escape its own
marginalization. Second, and more importantly, the
technicalities of law are precisely where the questions that
interest us actually are played out. Humanists should care
about technical legal devices because the kind of politics
that they purport to analyze is encapsulated there, along
with the hopes, ambitions, fantasies and day-dreams of
armies of legal engineers. 6 And third, and most important of
all, we have many sophisticated methods of analysis that
are uniquely suited to understanding this aspect of law,
should we choose to use them. This Essay therefore
proposes a new agenda for the cultural, or humanistic study
of law that focuses specifically on the technical dimensions
of law.7 We culturalists need to take on the technicalities.
4. James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1985).
5. John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 771, 778 (1998). Cf. James M. Cooper, Towards a New
Architecture: Creative Problem Solving and the Evolution of Law, 34 CAL. W. L.
REV. 297, 311 (1998) (celebrating law's role in social engineering by borrowing
Le Corbusier's high modernist rhetoric to claim that law is "a machine for
living").
6. BRUNO LATOUR, ARAMIS OR THE LOVE OF TECHNOLOGY iv (Catherine Porter
trans., 1996).
7. I will use the terms "cultural" and "humanistic" interchangeably.
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The technical character of law, as I will use the term,
encompasses diverse and even at times contradictory
subjects, ideologies, and practices. These include: (1) the
ideologies-legal instrumentalism and managerialism; (2)
the actors-the scholars and practitioners who treat the law
as a kind of tool or machine and who see themselves as
modest but expertly devoted technicians; (3) the problem-
solving paradigm-the orientation toward defining con-
crete, practical problems and toward crafting solutions; (4)
the form of technical legal doctrine and argumentation,
from eight-part tests to the intricacies of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, to the production of stock types of policy argu-
ments such as appeals to uniformity of result and ease of
administration on the one hand, or justice in the individual
case on the other. These different subjects nevertheless
share the simple fact that humanistically oriented legal
scholars are liable to find them profoundly uninteresting at
best, and offensive at worst.
What these add up to is a way of doing legal knowledge.
I want to suggest that this way of doing legal knowledge,
what I will call the technical aesthetics of law, is a rich and
exciting subject, and one that deserves to be at the forefront
of humanistic legal studies as a subject in its own right.
B. The conflict of laws as an exemplary site
I will argue the point by way of a demonstration: I want
to test a humanistic methodology against a legal field that
is so technical that even the instrumentalists seem close to
giving up. The field I have in mind is the conflict of laws
(Conflicts). I want to show the humanists on the one hand
that the technicalities of Conflicts are far more surprising
and interesting than they might imagine. And I want to
show the instrumentalists, on the other hand, that sophisti-
cated cultural analysis can at the very least clarify the
nature of technical problems that their own methods now
seem incapable of resolving.
The conflict of laws, or private international law as it is
commonly known outside the United States, is the body of
law that determines what law should regulate a dispute
that has multi-jurisdictional elements. To choose the
archetypal example, when residents of New York State
travel by car to Ontario and are involved in a car accident
there, should the law of New York or the law of Ontario
976 [Vol. 53
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govern the suit by the passenger against the driver?8 On
the surface, there is nothing particularly exciting about
these meta-rules, and that is precisely the point. They are
mere technologies, procedures for a prologue to the real
action of the legal dispute, simply a way of getting the
contest going. In this sense, Conflicts is a self-consciously
technical field. What distinguishes Conflicts from its
practitioners' point of view is that it locates its energy in
the production of a technology, a blueprint for a thing, a set
of doctrines and methods for resolving real disputes. In the
academy, the people who work most closely with its doc-
trines are practitioner-oriented trainers of future lawyers
who on the whole eschew "high theory" in favor of an
interest in real-world problems.
In recent years, the appetite for the technologies and
theoretical problems in the field seem to have waned,
leaving behind as many explanations for its demise as
defenders and critics.9 The subject is feared and disparaged
by academics and practitioners alike as a maze of legal
technicalities, the refuse of hopeless Realist idealism-"the
dismal swamp" 10 and, "law's psychiatric ward."'1 Surpris-
ingly, few American Conflicts teachers profess primary
scholarly interest in their subject.
Moreover, the technology seems incapable of solving
real-world problems: in practice, Lea Brilmayer argues,
"identifying the instrumental purpose underlying a rule
and deducing its appropriate territorial scope is not as
simple as one might think."'12 None of the numerous
doctrinal "approaches" invented by generations of post-
Realist scholars has managed to enroll a majority of allies
8. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
9. Friedrich Juenger, for example, asserts that the revolution, has led us
into a "dead-end alley." Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of
Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 50 (1984). He argues that the Realists
could not "fill the vacuum" left after their "relentless" critiques of Beale's
theories. Id. at 45.
10. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971
(1953).
11. Perry Dane, Conflicts of Laws, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 209 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
12. Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277,
1284 (1989); cf. Lawrence Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of
Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1301, 1303 (1989).
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in the academy or on the bench. Even the Second
Restatement's compromise attempt to find common ground
among these alternative approaches has been adopted only
in a plurality of jurisdictions. 13 Today, Conflicts inspires
more anxiety and frustration than interest or respect.
Numerous methods of reasoning exist in overt conflict with
one another such that there are few "right answers."'
14 Most
importantly perhaps, there is a sense among Conflicts
scholars that the potentially rich questions raised by
Conflicts cases-questions of cultural relativism, of
individual rights, of the limits of state power, or the
character of justice, for example-have been reduced to arid
technicalities. 15
What makes Conflicts an ideal site for a humanistic
rediscovery of the technical, in this context, is precisely the
way it appears so hopelessly uninteresting from both the
humanistic and the instrumentalist points of view. The
humanist will view Conflicts as essentially meaningless-as
a morass of highly technical, atheoretical doctrines devel-
oped by largely unknown academics in relative isolation
from the political process. These rules would seem to tell us
relatively little about the character of the political
community, for example, despite the best efforts of Conflicts
scholars to read questions of cultural relativism, or assump-
tions about the nature of citizenship, into mundane rules of
choice of law. 16 From an instrumentalist perspective, too,
Conflicts is largely a mess: while the formalist theory of the
First Restatement has been widely discredited as
13. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2002. Sixteenth Annual Survey, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4-5 (2003).
14. A typical casebook on the subject covers interest analysis, the "Second
Restatement Approach," the "Better Law Approach," law and economics
approaches, rule-based approaches, and critical legal studies approaches. See
generally DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS (6th ed. 2001).
15. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, "and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1191-1257 (1987); John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981); Alfred Hill,
Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 504 (1960); Juenger, supra note 9.
16. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Arthur T. von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (1977).
978 [Vol. 53
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unworkable, the "new approaches"'17 that followed the early
twentieth century Realist critiques of the First Restatement
have proven even more so.
Unlike the theorist of law's meanings, who at best
simply ignores the technical propensities of law, and unlike
the technocratic instrumentalist, who is engaged in doing
technical work, I want to use the history, doctrines, and
practices of the field of Conflicts as a site for exploring the
technical character of law with as much care and subtlety
as humanists are accustomed to giving law's meanings. I
will approach the technical in two ways in this Essay: first,
through a close reading of the twentieth-century doctrinal
canon, and second, through ethnographic materials
collected in the course of my own experience of teaching
Conflicts at two elite law schools at the end of the twentieth
century.
An analogy may help to explain what I have in mind.
As I have suggested, the dominant view of Conflicts today is
that it is a necessary but uninteresting, and ultimately
highly unsatisfactory, set of legal technologies. It is some-
thing like a very leaky faucet-a crucial but terribly dull
piece of plumbing that becomes apparent only by virtue of
the troublesome fact that it stubbornly refuses to work as it
should. Now the faucet contains nothing that on its surface
would render it of interest to those with a penchant for
cultural questions: it is not adorned with interesting mould-
ings or set in unusual mosaic; it is just an old-fashioned,
ordinary, leaky faucet.
To the extent that humanistic legal scholars would find
any reason to pay attention to the poor device at all, it
might be to critique the distributive consequences of plumb-
ing, or the gendered division of labor it has produced, or to
show the power of the plumber who comes each week to
hoodwink the consumer into buying yet another new faucet-
fixing gadget. Alternatively, a humanist with a great deal of
creative energy might explore the persons and practices
17. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963-1964); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach," 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965);
Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267 (1966); Arthur T. von Mehren, Comment: Special Substantive Rules
for Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of
Law Methodology, 88 HARv. L. REV. 347 (1974).
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that produced the leaky faucet: he or she might describe the
meetings of the leaky faucet fixers' association in all its
exotic and ironic detail and show how the fantasies of repair
and disrepair mirror wider forces at work in parallel fields
of greater interest to humanists-perhaps he or she could
find parallels to images of chaos and coherence in art or
literature, for example.
Yet what of the faucet itself? In each of the above
projects it is somewhat beside the point-a mere pretext for
telling the story of persons, practices, economic incentives
or power politics. Would it be possible for the humanist
truly to find something of interest in the mundane technolo-
gies of (faulty) plumbing-to take this crucial territory back
from the plumbers of the legal discipline? Here, we would
want to find a way to describe these techniques as some-
thing more than just the consequence of wider cultural
trends, and as something more robust than putty in the
hands of the technocrat. In other words, we would want to
account for the agency of technocratic legal form.
The argument proceeds as follows. In the following
subsection, Part C, I describe the theoretical and methodo-
logical approach of this Essay and explain its relationship
to other theoretical trends in areas such as Science and
Technology Studies, anthropology, and critical theory. The
demonstration begins in earnest in Part II. There, I trace
the outlines of the early twentieth century debate between
"formalist" and "Realist" approaches to Conflicts. I argue
that by describing law as a tool, that is, by appealing to an
instrumentalist view of law through the metaphor of the
tool, Realist Conflicts scholars were able to recast their
adversaries as historical antecedents, doctrinal dinosaurs
who just didn't get instrumentalism.
In Part III, I make a crucial culturalist move: I put
aside the content of this instrumentalist argument to focus
on its form. Here, I argue that despite all the talk about
instrumentalism, the key analytical form at issue in the
modern Conflicts revolution was ironically a form that
culturalists are uniquely experts in: metaphor. The
principal insight of Realism was that law was best
imagined metaphorically as a tool, and that the lawyer and
legal theorist was best imagined metaphorically also as if
he were a techno-scientist. The astounding success of the
Realist project can be accounted for largely in terms of its
sophisticated usage of metaphor.
[Vol. 53980
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But what happened to those metaphors in the decades
after the Realists revolutionized Conflicts doctrines? In Part
IV, I make a surprising discovery. Here, I take the analysis
beyond traditional humanist interpretive methods and
deploy insights from Science Studies and the anthropology
of knowledge to point to something so exotic and strange
right at the center of our legal doctrines that we lack the
ability to even take notice of it. In mid-century Conflicts, I
argue, the idea that law was like a tool quite literally be-
came a tool of its own. When faced with a Conflict between
two applicable laws, the judge was now to think of each law
as a tool of social policy and ask whether the particular
social policy the tool was designed to address was at issue
in the present case. If it could be found that the policy was
not at issue, the Conflicts problem could be "solved." In
other words, the surprising fact is this: in midcentury,
metaphorical use of technoscience in legal theory was
literalized; it became a reality. It takes some thinking to
appreciate the enormity of this development. We might
think of the law as a Temple of Justice without expecting it
one day to turn into a physical temple, but something
analogous is what happened, beneath our noses, by force of
our instrumental deployment of metaphor.
That something as strange and even surreal as this
should come to pass in a mundane corner of technical
doctrine should go much of the way in convincing human-
ists that the technicalities of law can turn out to be far
more interesting than they might have imagined. But I go
beyond this to demonstrate to the instrumentalists in all of
us that a cultural approach to Conflicts can provide a
convincing explanation of the much-touted late-twentieth-
century "muddle" of Conflicts doctrines. Through a close
reading of Conflicts texts, and through ethnographic
materials gathered from my own experience teaching the
doctrines of Conflicts, I explore some of the aesthetic dimen-
sions of this literalization. I show that the decline of
Conflicts is not so much the result of a failure to reach
adequate solutions to concrete legal problems-current
doctrine does this just as well as any other doctrinal
approach-but rather that the literalization I uncover has
an unintended consequence. Borrowing from sociology,
anthropology, and cognate fields, I show how when any
analysis, from ritual to board games, becomes too mechani-
cal, too literal, that is, when it loses its metaphorical qual-
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ity, it lacks the very formal qualities that sustain interest.
The problem with Conflicts, I argue, is ultimately not that
it is a bad set of doctrines; the problem is that the game is
no longer fun to play.
Finally, in Part V, I leave Conflicts and return to the
broader argument for attention to the technical dimensions
of law often ignored by humanistic and cultural legal
studies. Humanists need to devote themselves to a more
sophisticated understanding of the tools of law, the techni-
cal dimensions of legal form. I argue that the Realist
fascination with the intricacies of "legal tools" exemplified
in debates about Conflicts jurisprudence provides a long-
forgotten antecedent for the cultural study of legal
technicalities.
C. The Agency of Legal Form: A Methodological Proposal
What might humanistic approaches contribute to an
aspect of legal knowledge defined precisely by the absence
of meaning, that traditional province of humanistic inquiry?
Traditionally, humanistic scholars within and without the
legal academy have approached the technical in one of two
ways. The first has been critique: There is a rich tradition
in legal scholarship and cognate fields of critiques of
technocracy and of the power of the technocrat by virtue of
his particular knowledge practices' 8 that certainly could be
extended to encompass the legal technicalities and the
technocratic fantasies of modern conflict of laws doctrines.
Critiques of the differential effects of technocratic power
hidden beneath the technocrat's veneer of objective neutral-
ity serve as a kind of refrain in critical legal studies,19
18. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT:
STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 92 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE
ABUSE OF REASON (1952); MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION
BUILDING: SELECTED PAPERS (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968); LANGDON WINNER,
AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A THEME IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1977).
19. James Boyle summarizes the early CLS critique of the legal realists'
fascination with the "neutrality of technical knowledge." James Boyle, The
Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 685, 698 (1985). He echoes a wide spectrum of left political thought
within and without the law where he argues that "by withdrawing political
questions from the public sphere and giving them over to expert decision
982 [Vol. 53
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feminist legal theory,20  and the sociology of law. 21
Anthropologists and cultural historians, likewise, have
followed early critics of technocracy 22 to draw attention to
the politics of seemingly objective and transparent techno-
cratic knowledge. 23 These critics of technocracy have been
as interested in the limits and failures of technocratic
planning as its enabling effects, 24 and they have shown how
these failures often serve to create further "targets for
intervention," as when a failed development project creates
a demand for further development projects to rectify earlier
errors. 25
A second humanistic approach to the technical goes
beyond critique to paint a rich picture of the persons and
making, technocratic rationality actually diminishes the possibility of democ-
ratic debate over ends, in the name of an improved analysis of means." Id. at
751. Cf. FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE
POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (2000).
20. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1, 12 (2001) (arguing that "technocentric expansionism" is a kind of "gender-
segregation" that lawyers should oppose); Sarah S. Jain, Inscription Fantasies
and Interface Erotics: A Social-Material Analysis of Keyboards, Repetitive
Strain Injuries and Products Liability Law, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 219
(1998) (arguing that culturally specific and gendered notions of pain and every-
day practice are inscribed in both the technologies of the workplace and the
products liability law that governs them).
21. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN
AMERICAN STATES (2002); Wendy Espeland, Legally Mediated Identities: The
National Environmental Policy Act and the Bureaucratic Construction of
Interests, 28 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 1149 (1994).
22. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1973);
LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION (1934); THEODORE ROSZAK, THE
MAKING OF A COUNTERCULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON THE TECHNOCRATIC SOCIETY AND
ITS YOUTHFUL OPPOSITION (1969).
23. See, e.g., AUDIT CULTURES: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN
ACCOUNTABILITY, ETHICS, AND THE ACADEMY (Marilyn Strathern ed., 2000); cf.
TIMOTHY MITCHELL, RULE OF EXPERTS: EGYPT, TECHNO-POLITICS, MODERNITY
(2002).
24. See, e.g, Robert Castel, From Dangerousness to Risk, in THE FOUCAULT
EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 281, 288 (Graham Burchell et al. eds.,
1991). See generally LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY
DOCUMENTS TO TAME DISASTER (1999).
25. See, e.g., Castel, supra note 24, at 288. See generally JAMES FERGUSON,
THE ANTI-POLITICS MACHINE: "DEVELOPMENT," DEPOLITICIZATION, AND
BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN LESOTHO (1990); KIM FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER
BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, NEW GLOBAL ORDERS (2001).
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cultures that produce technical practices. The goal here has
been to describe the ironies, double-binds, and self-aggran-
dizing rituals that characterize the technocratic life, and to
explore the wider cultural milieu in which the technocrat
finds himself.26 Important contributions have also been
made by scholars interested in the relationship of techno-
cratic knowledge to the constellation of cultural practices
and epistemological positions shorthanded as legal
modernism. 27 Much progress has been made, also, in under-
standing the relationship between the aesthetics of
mundane technocratic practices and modernist aesthetics,
broadly conceived. 28
This careful attention to the person of the technocrat
and his mundane life, whether in legal scholarship or
cognate fields, has produced some of the most exciting
humanistic investigations of legal practices of recent
decades. Yet I want to suggest that it would be of interest to
talk not just about people and epistemes, but about
technical legal knowledge itself-about the theories, the
models, the arguments, the techniques. 29 In other words,
26. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Autumn Weekends: An Essay on Law and
Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1993); David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 9 (1999); David Kennedy, Spring Break, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1377
(1985); David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 335 (2000) (drawing attention to the "dark side of
expertise" and the "blind spots" of well-intentioned technocratic projects).
27. See, e.g,, DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM (1994); PAUL RABINOW,
FRENCH MODERN: NORMS AND FORMS OF THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT (1989);
Nathaniel Berman, 'But the Alternative is Despair: European Nationalism and
the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792 (1993).
28. See, e.g,, GEORGINA BORN, RATIONALIZING CULTURE: IRCAM, BOULEZ, AND
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE MUSICAL AVANT-GARDE (1995); R.L. RUTSKY,
HIGH TECHNIC: ART & TECHNOLOGY FROM THE MACHINE AESTHETIC TO THE
POSTHUMAN (1999). This interest in the aesthetics of technology, and the
relationship between technology and aesthetics in knowledge practice, has a
long and diverse pedigree. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS (William Lovitt trans., 1977)
(1952, 1954, & 1962).
29. I draw my inspiration here from a diverse and eclectic collection of
projects that address questions of legal technology in whole or in part. See
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION. (1977); PAUL W.
KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA (1997); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIkCLE]
(1997); MARIANA VALVERDE, LAW'S DREAM OF A COMMON KNOWLEDGE (2003);
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the goal of this Essay is to bring the technical into view not
as an effect or a byproduct, a tool of more important agents
and forces, but as the protagonist of its own account.
30
In thinking about this methodological problem, I have
found it helpful to reflect laterally on theoretical
innovations produced in two contexts that are admittedly
quite distinct from the law: the fields of Science and
Technology Studies and the Anthropology of Knowledge.
Science and Technology Studies (STS) is a vast and
heterogeneous field. 31 However, it becomes of interest in the
present context because STS scholars have long recognized
the value of an ethnographic approach to the production of
scientific and technical thought. Beginning with a series of
laboratory studies conducted in the 1970s, 3 2 STS scholars
spent long hours observing the mundane daily routines of
scientists in order to understand the social and material
production of scientific truth, and in particular the
"contrast between the situated and improvisational
performances of actual practices in 'messy' practical and
interactional circumstances" and "rationally reconstructed
Kunal Parker, The History of Experience: On the Historical Imagination of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 26 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 60 (2003)
30. See LATOUR, supra note 6, at vii.
31. It is generally acknowledged to have begun in the 1970s with the so-
called "strong program" in the sociology of knowledge. Michael Lynch quotes its
founder, David Bloor, on the ideal features of this project:
1. It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which
bring about belief or states of knowledge....
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or
irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will
require explanation.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types
of cause would explain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would
have to be applicable to sociology itself..., otherwise sociology would
be a standing refutation of its own theories.
MICHAEL LYNCH, SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE AND ORDINARY ACTION:
ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE 74 (1993) (footnote
omitted).
32. See generally KARIN KNORR CETINA, EPISTEMIC CULTURES: HOW THE
SCIENCES MAKE KNOWLEDGE (1999); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR,
LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1986); MICHAEL
LYNCH, ART AND ARTIFACT IN LABORATORY SCIENCE: A STUDY OF SHOP WORK AND
SHOP TALK IN A RESEARCH LABORATORY (1985).
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experimental reasoning in textbooks and research
reports. '3 3 Latour and Woolgar, for example, argued for a
kind of studied anthropological curiosity, in which the
humanist would "bracket our familiarity with the object of
study"34 and adopt a posture of "artificial distance." 35
A fundamental insight of STS is that the character of
the tools matters: technologies come into being in order to
overcome the political and epistemological limits of existing
knowledge, and hence these technologies are best under-
stood quite literally as politics by other means.36 Because
the tools play such an important role in the production of
knowledge, changes in seemingly mundane tools can lead to
fundamental epistemological shifts.37 The ultimate lesson
here is that the kinds of themes of traditional concern to
humanists, such as the nature of politics, or debates in
moral philosophy, are deeply embedded in the most
mundane and material forms of the technocracy, that is, its
tools. 38
To date, this work has had only a limited impact on
legal scholarship, as it has been confined to the more
narrow and literal context in which science and law come
into contact, such as debates over the uses of expert
scientific testimony in the courtroom, 39 or the implications
33. LYNCH, supra note 31, at 92.
34. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 32, at 277.
35. Id. at 279.
36. See generally LATOUR, supra note 6; Fabian Muniesa, Un robot
walrasien: cotation 6lctronique et justesse de la ddcouverte des Prix, 13 POLITIX
121 (2000).
37. See generally THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB: AT WORK IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY LIFE SCIENCES (Adele E. Clarke & Joan H. Fujimura eds., 1992).
38. For example, in her study of the representation of numbers, Mary
Poovey shows how the invention of double-entry bookkeeping both enabled the
exponential growth of mercantile capitalism and contributed to the "rule-
governed system" that "provided the model for effective government" through its
visual display of transparency, virtue, credit-worthiness. MARY POOVEY, A
HISTORY OF THE MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS WITH KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF
WEALTH AND SOCIETY xvi (1998).
39. See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of
Science in Law, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2002); David S. Caudill & Richard E.
Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science? The Paradox of Expertise and
Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685 (2000); Gary
Edmond, Comment, Azaria's Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific)
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of regulatory innovations on the practice of science. 40 In this
Essay, I have in mind a more radical use of these
approaches: if we take seriously Conflicts scholars' sugges-
tion that law is a species of techno-science, why not borrow
from the humanistic study of the character of techno-
scientific knowledge methods for thinking about legal
knowledge more broadly?41
One of the most controversial and interesting insights
of the STS literature concerns the agency of scientific tools
in the production of scientific truths. Truth, in this view, is
an artifact of networks of material and non-material,
human and non-human "actants." Concrete materials tools
such as a microscope or a cyclotron enable humans to know
certain things-microbes only come into being for the
scientist with the invention of the microscope. These tools
also guide and limit how humans will go about their work:
although microbes are at the center of the scientific inquiry
in the eighteenth century metropolis, those same microbes
do not "exist" in quite the same way-they cannot be made
to come into view-in an environment where the microscope
cannot be made to function correctly, such as a distant
colonial outpost. As Andrew Pickering puts it in his study of
the deliberations of mathematicians, "[h]uman and
nonhuman agents are associated with one another in
networks, and evolve together within those networks."42
Construction of the Chamberlains' Guilt and Innocence, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 396
(1998); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Litigation Life: Law-Science Knowledge
Construction in (Bendectin) Mass Toxic Tort Litigation, 30 Soc. STUD. SCI. 265
(2000); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Comment: Scripting Expertise: The History of
Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of
Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint
Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 15 (2001)
("[S]crutiny of expert evidence does not take place in a cultural vacuum. What
seems obvious, what needs to be proven, what can be taken for granted, and
what is viewed as problematic all depend on cultural assumptions and shared
beliefs, and these can change over time .... ").
40. See, e.g., Claire Polster, How the Law Works: Exploring the Implications
of Emerging Intellectual Property Regimes for Knowledge, Economy and Society,
49(4) CURRENT SOC., July 2001, at 85.
41. Two important recent books extend the insights of STS to think about
the practice of judging in this way. See generally BRUNO LATOUR, LA FABRIQUE
DU DROIT: UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE DU CONSEIL D'ETAT (2002); VALVERDE, supra note
29.
42. ANDREW PICKERING, THE MANGLE OF PRACTICE: TIME, AGENCY, AND
SCIENCE 11 (1995).
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Pickering describes a "dance of agency" between the human
and non-human:
As active, intentional beings, scientists tentatively
construct some new machine. They then adopt a passive
role, monitoring the performance of the machine to see
whatever capture of material agency it might affect.
Symmetrically, this period of human passivity is the period
in which material agency actively manifests itself.43
Pickering's work becomes particularly relevant to the
technical dimensions of legal thought where he extends the
notion of the tool to include not just material tools but
theories.44 The radical insight is that theoretical innova-
tions are not simply the product of persons, or even of their
social or epistemic contexts. Rather, some agency must be
attributed to the machine or the model itself.
Another project in the anthropology of knowledge takes
these same theoretical insights in a different direction, to
explore questions of aesthetics, or form, in modern techno-
cratic knowledge. 45 For example, Marilyn Strathern has
described the taken for granted "aesthetics of scale" that
pervade the modern social scientific imagination-the
tendency to think in terms of levels of scale such that one
can always switch to another level in the analysis-and
when one does, one only encounters the same infinite
quantity of information. This focus on questions of form
resonates in turn with insights in literary and linguistic
theory about the "performative" character of knowledge-
43. Id. at 21-22. For example, he describes the discovery of a new algerbraic
entity, the "quarternion," as a dance of agency between the mathematician and
his models in which, in the first instance, the mathematician establishes a
"bridgehead"-he creatively imagines a way of extending a theory to a new
domain. Then, in the next stage of "transcription," it is the theory that does the
work, as the analogy is deployed. This is followed by "further free moves" on the
part of the mathematician and also by "resistance" on the part of the model-it
does not do what the mathematician had hoped it would do, and this leads in
turn to further "accommodation" on the part of the mathematician. See id. at
127-35.
44. See id. at 11.
45. See generally ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000);
MARILYN STRATHERN, PARTIAL CONNECTIONS (1991); MARILYN STRATHERN, THE
RELATION: ISSUES IN COMPLEXITY AND SCALE (1995).
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about how speech is not just a collection of meanings but an
act with consequences in the world.
46
In this Essay, I adapt these disparate insights and
methodological proposals to focus on the agency of legal
form as it has presented itself in modern conflict of laws
doctrines. What I offer below is not an intellectual history of
Conflicts, nor is it a sociological or anthropological account
of the culture of Conflicts scholarship-it is not an account
of persons and their ideas in time or in socio-cultural
context. Rather, my aim is to focus on the agency of the
technicalities themselves.
II. THE REALIST CRITIQUE
Today, Conflicts is taught and written about as a series
of problem-solving methods, a way of disposing of actual
cases.47 Although these methods are diverse, the key
modern insight is that Conflicts questions should be
resolved by reflecting on the purposes of the laws at issue,
and hence by asking a series of pragmatic, and technical
questions about whether and how the purposes of the
statutes ("state interests") 48 are served by the application of
each state's law to the controversy. The questions in the
casebooks and the hypotheticals teachers present to stu-
dents cast the student in the role of the decision-maker
continually faced with the task of coming up with a solu-
tion. The subject is presented as a body of technical and
instrumental knowledge, a series of problem-solving "meth-
ods" rather than "theories."49
46. See generally JOHN L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (1975);
JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997).
Austin offers the example of the utterance of the phrase "I do [take this woman
to be my lawful wedded wife]," which is not simply a statement but an act.
AUSTIN, supra, at 10, 12.
47. See, e.g., Lawrence Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979
(1991); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law: Interest Analysis and Its "New Crits," 36
AM. J. COMP. L. 681, 681-82 (1988); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and
Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34
MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983); David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis: The Quest for
Perfection and the Frailties of Man, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 207 (1981).
48. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 181.
49. See, e.g., ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1945).
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As every Conflicts student knows, this approach to the
subject is deeply indebted to its history. For if the field now
seems arid and technical, Conflicts professors never tire of
reminding their students that it was once the site of high
legal theory. In the 1930s, Conflicts was a crucial site for
the Realist assault on legal formalism, 50 and in mid-
century, it was the focus of intensive legal engineering, a
place for doctrinal experimentation. What looks like a low-
brow technical mess today, therefore, was once the show-
case for a "paradigm shift" to pragmatic instrumentalism to
be achieved, in the minds of its proponents, by substituting
new legal tools for old.51
In this Part, I ask what this innovation was really
about in Conflicts. As we will see, through innovations in
Conflicts doctrines, early and mid-twentieth century schol-
ars sought to redefine law as technology and legal scholars
as scientifically informed technicians. 52 The fantasy of the
Conflicts Revolution, as it is called, 53 was to engineer a
technical system that would allow for both flexibility and
durability; that would take into account both matters of
individual choice and matters of collective costs; that would
deliver both justice in the individual case and the
maximization of general welfare; that would hybridize
state-of-the-art technology with responsiveness to the
concerns of the man on the street. In sum, the goal was to
50. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:
COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at
311-50 (1997); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE:
ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960
(1986).
51. Cf. THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB: AT WORK IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIFE
SCIENCES (Adele E. Clarke & Joan H. Fujimura eds., 1992) (commenting on the
impact of the tools available to scientists on the evolution of scientific
paradigms).
52. See Heinrich Kronstein, Crisis of "Conflict of Laws," 37 GEO L.J. 483,
486-87 (1949); cf. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL
THEORY (1982).
53. The term "conflicts revolution" has been used widely to denote the
intellectual movement beginning in the 1930s and culminating in the 1960s
that preached the demolition of the traditional choice-of-law methodology
expressed in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) and its
replacement with a variety of so-called "modern approaches." See generally
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 25-74 (3d ed. 2000).
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create a legal device that would incorporate both a critique
of modernity and a utopian vision of how it might be made
better. The field of Conflicts has also long been a privileged
place, in other words, of modernist innovation.
54
In today's Conflicts hornbooks and casebooks, two
approaches are presented in historical sequence, as if one
displaced the other in time. The first is the so-called tradi-
tional approach, most often associated with Joseph Beale.
55
After this overview of vested rights theory, which is
presented as a kind of prehistory of modern Conflicts
doctrine, students learn "the modern approach," which is to
say, the doctrines associated with the Realist Revolution in
Conflicts. 56 I begin by summarizing each of these briefly.
A. The Formalist Project in Conflicts
Beginning with an article published in 1896, 57 and
culminating in his work as reporter of the First
54. On legal modernism, see generally LUBAN, supra note 27; Nathaniel
Berman, "But the Alternative Is Despair": European Nationalism and the
Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1792 (1993);
Nathaniel Berman, Modernism, Nationalism, and the Rhetoric of
Reconstruction, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 351 (1992); Nathaniel Berman, A
Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the Limits of the
Interwar Framework, 33 HARV INT'L L.J. 353 (1992).
55. Joseph Beale was a professor of law at Harvard Law School from 1892 to
1937. From 1902 to 1904, Beale also served as the first dean of the Chicago Law
School. See JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 263 (1995). Beale was not alone in this project. See also HERBERT F.
GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927).
56. See, e.g., CURRIE ET AL., supra note 14. The teachers' manuals to
Conflicts casebooks are particularly explicit sources of dogma on this point.
Teachers are admonished again and again that the point of the lesson is to
demonstrate the traditional doctrine's descriptive inaccuracy, its indeterminacy
and its unjustness of results.
57. See generally Joseph H. Beale, Dicey's "Conflict of Laws" 10 HARV. L.
REV. 168 (1896-97); see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAws (1900-02); Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity
of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1909) [Beale, Validity of a Contract 1]; Joseph
H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: II The Present
Condition of the Authorities, 23 HARV. L. REV. 79 (1909) [Beale, Validity of a
Contract I]; Joseph H. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract: III.
Theoretical and Practical Criticisms of Authority, 23 HARV. L. REV. 260 (1910)
[Beale, Validity of a Contract I11].
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Restatement of Conflict of Laws5 8 and his treatise on the
subject,59 Joseph Beale unseated the approach to Conflicts
developed by fellow Harvard Law School professor and
Associate Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story-an
approach founded on the quasi-legal, quasi-diplomatic,
quasi-policy-oriented concept of comity,60 in favor of a new
theory of "vested rights." Beale argued that each legal right
was created at a particular jurisdiction, the jurisdiction in
which it vested. As such, the law of that jurisdiction was
integral to the constitution of the right itself, and hence
only the law of the jurisdiction of vesting could govern
subsequent disputes. For another jurisdiction to apply its
own law to the adjudication of the right simply because the
adjudication took place in its forum would be to infringe on
the sovereignty of the jurisdiction in which the right
vested.61
Beale's vested rights theory offered a purposely
mechanical methodology for deciding Conflicts cases: every
case could be addressed through a two-step analysis. First,
the judge was to ask what kind of law was at issue. Was the
question of whether or not an employee could sue his
employer for injuries sustained on the job a question of tort
or contract? Next, a series of "localizing rules" would tell the
judge where the rights had vested and hence what law
58. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
59. See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935).
60. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC § 35, at 34 (1834):
The true foundation on which the administration of international law
must rest is that the rules which are to govern are those which arise
from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences
which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a spirit of moral
necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return.
Id. Beale criticized the comity theory for its status as policy rather than law:
The doctrine seems really to mean only that in certain cases the
sovereign is not prevented by any principle of international law, but
only by his own choice, from establishing any rule he pleases for the
conflict of laws. In other words, it is an enabling principle rather than
one which in any particular case would determine the actual rule of
law.
BEALE, supra note 59, at app. § 71, at 1965.
61. See BEALE, supra note 59, at § 5.4, at 53.
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governed them. In the case of tort, for example, the judge
was to apply the law of the place of the last act that
constituted the tort, since it was at that moment that the
rights vested, 62 while in a case of contract, the place of
vesting was the place of contracting. 63
B. The Realist Response
Almost as soon as it was elaborated, however, Beale's
vested rights theory emerged as an ideal target in the Legal
Realists' larger critique of legal formalism. Chief among the
Realist critics of vested rights theory was Walter Wheeler
Cook, a specialist in Conflicts and Labor Law, 64 although
other important Realist critics of Beale included David
62. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 58, at §
384 (1934).
63. See id. § 332. Beale did recognize a number of exceptions to his highly
formalistic scheme, including the possibility that foreign law might be
repugnant to domestic public policy. See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity
of a Contract; III. Theoretical and Practical Criticisms of Authority, note 57.
64. Cook was hired at the Nebraska Law School in 1903 under Roscoe
Pound's deanship. He taught at Missouri, Wisconsin and Chicago before moving
to Yale in 1919. From 1935 to 1943, he helped found the Institute of Law at
Johns Hopkins University with the goal of providing a more jurisprudential
kind of training than was offered at American law schools and of promoting
more empirical research in the law. When the Institute closed in 1933, Cook
moved to Northwestern Law School where he taught until his death in 1943.
See SCHLEGEL, supra note 55, at 147-210.
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Cavers, 65 Hessel Yntema, 66 Elliott Cheatham,67 and Ernest
Lorenzen. 6
8
Along with his Realist colleagues, Cook used Beale's
Restatement as material for a prototypical realist critique
of legal formalism.69 As Cook described Beale and his
cohort:
Such writers begin with reflecting upon and establishing to their
satisfaction the general or essential nature of law and legal rights.
This leads them to certain general or fundamental principles,
supposed to flow from the nature of law and legal rights as thus
established. These fundamental principles take the form of general
65. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933). Cavers began his teaching career at the University of
West Virginia in 1930 and taught at Duke from 1931 until he was appointed to
the faculty at Harvard in 1945. He taught at Harvard until he retired in 1969 to
become president of the Walter Meyer Research Institute in Law, a short-lived
institute to promote social scientific research in the law, where he served until
1976. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 55, at 244-48, 264.
66. See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of
Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). Yntema taught at Columbia Law School from
1921 to 1933, when he moved to Johns Hopkins to join Cook's project for a legal
institute. He taught at Johns Hopkins and then at the University of Michigan
Law School. See SCHLEGEL supra note 55, at 269.
67. See, e.g., Elliott Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their
Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361 (1945).
68. See, e.g., Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924). Lorenzen taught at Yale Law School
from 1917. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 101
(2001).
69. Laura Kalman recounts how Beale served as a kind of stock character in
the realist critique of formalism, which Jerome Frank termed "Bealism."
Kalman cites a short poem by Thurmond Arnold:
Beale, Beale, marvelous Beale,
Only in verse can we tell how we feel,
When our efforts so strenuous to overthrow,
Your reasoning tenuous, don't seem to go.
For the law is a system of wheels within wheels.
Invented by Thayers and Sayers and Beales,
With each little wheel so exactly adjusted,
That if it is damaged the whole thing is busted.
So cease from refuting what can't be disputed,
Abandon disputing what can't be refuted,
and BOW to the frantic pedantic romantic
Effusive abusive illusive conclusive
Evasive, persuasive, marvelous Beale.
KALMAN, supra note 68, at 26.
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statements as to what-in view of the essential nature of law and
legal rights-a state or country 'can' or 'cannot' do in the way of
creating rights, duties, and other legal relations. They thus come
to think that the conflict of laws 'deals with the recognition and
enforcement of foreign-created rights' or that it has to do with the
application of law in space .... 70
Again and again, Cook demonstrated with regard to
individual conflicts doctrines 71 that whatever courts might
say about how they reached decisions, they could not
possibly deduce outcomes from abstract principles such as
the rule that property rights vest at the situs 72 or that
rights in contract vest at the place of contracting. 73 What
situs would apply in the case of intangible forms of
property, or torts where the injury was spread across
multiple jurisdictions, for example? Moreover, the very
notion that rights "vested" in certain spaces was fundamen-
tally, logically flawed. For this reason, Cook argued, Beale's
vested rights theory in practice was neither easy to use nor
consistent in its effects. "The final result of a confusion of
terminology" like the first restatement, Cook wrote, "can
only be that a general principle . . . adopted obviously for
social convenience, will be applied by a pseudo-logical
process so as to reach results which are required neither by
principle itself nor by the social policy upon which the
principle is supposed to be based. 74
70. Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Law, 33
YALE L. J. 457, 459 (1924) (quoting Beale).
71. See Walter W. Cook, 'Characterization' in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE
L.J. 191, 210 (1941) [hereinafter Cook, Characterization] (demonstrating that
the restatement's proposals on characterization provided no substantive
guidance to courts because they were logically circular); Walter W. Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1932-
1933) (demonstrating that whether a rule is procedural or substantive can only
be determined with reference to the context and purposes of the rule in
question); Walter W. Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 202 (1935).
72. See Walter W. Cook, 'Immovables' and the 'Law' of the 'Situs'" A Study in
the Ambiguity of Legal Terminology, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1246, 1264 (1939)
(demonstrating that the restatement rule applying the law of the situs to
conflicts over property logically means different things depending on whether
the forum is the jurisdiction of the situs or another jurisdiction).
73. See Walter W. Cook, 'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws, 31 ILL. L. REV
143 (1936).
74. Cook, supra note 72, at 1274.
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In attacking the doctrine of vested rights, Cook and his
cohort were self-consciously taking on the paradigm of
lawyerly thinking.7 5 The Conflicts Revolution was framed
as part of a wider assault on lawyerly knowledge that in
turn belied the Realist antipathy towards the practicing
bar.76 Cook and Yntema severely criticized the restatement
project and the "hornbook method" of Beale and his
supporters as precisely the wrong way to think about
Conflicts.7 7 In his review of Beale's treatise, Cook belittles
its orientation toward the practicing bar and its resulting
relegation of all historical and theoretical questions to the
appendix.7
s
Cook's own proposal was what he termed a theory of
"local law." In fact, it was not so much a theory as an
elaboration of the exact opposite premises to vested rights.
It simply held, following standard Realist dogma, that the
adjudication of a right in effect created the right, and hence:
No court ever enforces foreign law as such. Under our system of
the conflict of laws, an American court when asked to give
damages for an alleged foreign tort ... will 'apply' the 'substantive
law' of the other state in question. Although it is often said that
the 'substantive law' of the other state 'governs' the case, the word
'governs' is misleading: an American court does not hand the case
over to the law of the foreign state for decision. If it allows a
recovery, it merely decides, on grounds of social convenience, to
give a right to damages as 'nearly homologous as possible' to the
right given by the foreign law.
79
C. A Collection of Statements
I mentioned at the outset of this Part that the two sides
of this debate are taught in today's Conflicts classes as a
kind of historical sequence in which realism replaces
formalism in time, complete with periodizing terms such as
75. I thank Robert Gordon for this insight.
76. See HORWITZ, supra note 50, at 183.
77. See generally Walter W. Cook, Review of Joseph Beale, Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1154; see also Yntema, supra note 66, at
468-69.
78. See Cook, supra note 77, at 1154.
79. Cook, Characterization, supra note 71, at 200.
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"traditional" and "modern" approaches. However, the two
approaches were far more contemporaneous than this
pedagogy suggests.8 0 The so-called traditional approach was
in fact very much a recent innovation at the time of the
Realist critiques. The First Restatement's vested-right
approach remains alive and well, moreover, in a minority of
American jurisdictions (not to mention in the approaches to
Private International Law used by most countries in the
world) today.81 Most importantly, what is lost in this
temporal story is that Beale argued for his vested rights
approach on the same kind of instrumental grounds as
Realist interventions: resolving conflicts according to a
theory of vested rights would ease administration and
would best promote uniformity of decision and foreseeabil-
ity of outcomes.
8 2
80. Cook was only thirteen years Beale's junior, and both scholars taught
and wrote until their deaths in the same year, 1943. As Tom Grey points out,
this contemporaneity is true of the relationship between Realism and formalism
more generally: Langdell began teaching in the very year that Holmes wrote his
first article. See Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL SERIES, 1999, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid+200732.
81. See Symeonides, supra note 13.
82. This shared instrumentalist orientation is particularly evident in a
debate between Beale and the Realists over the proper choice of law rule
concerning the validity of a contract. Against Beale's argument that the law of
the place of contracting should determine a contract's validity (see Beale, What
Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, supra note 57), the Realists proposed a
rule of party autonomy: the validity of the contract should be judged by the law
the parties expressly or implicitly chose for themselves. See Cook, supra note
73, at 899-920 (1936); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in
the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565 (1920-21). Beale responded that this
would amount to allowing the parties to engage in a legislative act since by
choosing an alternative law they could in essence legislate the terms of validity
of contracts. Cook in turn responded that if the parties legislated, they did so
only for themselves, and hence were not acts of law-making, a claim that
finessed the realists' own deconstruction of the private quality of contracts. See
WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 399
(1942); see also Hessel E. Yntema, Contract and Conflict of Laws: 'Autonomy" in
Choice of Law in the United States, 1 N.Y.L.F. 46 (1955); Hessel E. Yntema,
"Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341 (1952). To this, Beale
responded with precisely the internal Realist critique that had been leveled at
him: marshalling the realists' own critiques of contract law, he asked how one
could claim that a rule of party autonomy was foreseeable when in fact the
question of what the parties intended was itself open to judicial manipulation
and caprice? See Beale, Validity of a Contract III, supra note 57, at 260-61. As
Joseph Singer has pointed out, the arguments in this debate contradict received
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This now generally-accepted historical sequence (what-
ever one thinks of the Revolution, one knows that it
displaced a formalist past) must be read, therefore, as a
rhetorical achievement. As a first step toward a humanistic
study of Conflicts, then, we would need to ask not just
whether this historical claim is right or wrong, but what it
achieves or performs; what are its effects?
On this point, STS offers a useful insight. STS scholars
have shown again and again that what look like incontro-
expectations that the formalist position would defend freedom of contract
against a Realist argument for restricting party autonomy. See Singer, supra
note 16, at 75-76 (1989).
At the time of these controversies, De Sloovere argued that Beale did not
overlook "(1) the human elements involved, (2) judicial policies, (3) juristic
theories, (4) the immediate and mediate ends of law even though these are not
always extant in the cases." Frederick L. de Sloovere, On Looking into Mr.
Beale's Conflict of Laws, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. 333, 335 (1936); cf. Leon Arthur
Harding, Joseph Henry Beale: Pioneer, 2 Mo. L. REV. 131, 136-37 (1937); Hill,
supra note 15, at 504. Henry McClintock likewise insisted that, "Professor
Beale has more consistently followed the approved inductive method than have
his critics." Henry L. McClintock, Beale on the Conflict of Laws, 84 U. PA. L.
REV. 309, 310 (1936).
With hindsight, we can conclude that Beale in fact articulated the
instrumentalist standard for success for a Conflicts theory against which his
vested rights theory was later judged by his critics to have failed. This standard
of success remains Beale's lasting achievement: the understanding that a
Conflicts theory will have succeeded when it achieves ease of administration
and uniformity of results, and will have failed if it does not, has achieved the
status of a given in the field in a way that Beale's vested rights theory never
did. Latent in this definition of success is a very modernist understanding of
law as a tool. I follow Thomas Grey's suggestion that we understand
"formalism" as a modernist approach to law rather than a premodernist one.
See Grey, supra note 80. For examples of the realists' appropriation of this
instrumentalist measure of the success of Conflicts doctrines, see Robert T.
Donley, The Modern Influence in the Conflict of Laws, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 217, 243
(1930) ("But in the maturity of the law the very idea of stability and
predictability is an interest to be secured, and is of the highest importance.");
M. Hancock, Choice-of-Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO L.
REV. 133, 135-36 (1943) (arguing for the choice of law policies of fairness to the
parties, uniformity, predictability, and recognizing the interest of states in
transactions occurring in their territories); Raymond J. Heilman, Judicial
Method and Economic Objectives in Conflict of Laws, 43 YALE L.J. 1082, 1108
(1934) ("The chief functions which the rules of Conflict of Laws ought to be
made to serve are: to provide certainty and uniformity as to predictability of
legal consequences of specific factual situations; beyond that, to provide to the
greatest extent possible through the imposition of legal consequences,
uniformity of economic and other social consequences of the kind generally
thought desirable throughout the larger commonwealth.").
2005] CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 999
vertible, natural facts are in fact best seen as "collections of
statements."8 3 One such collection of statements becomes
"true" when (1) it enrolls sufficient allies such that it would
not be politically feasible to contest it (it becomes "black
boxed")8 4 and (2) it proves to be "doable" (often in ways that
have little inherently to do with the substance of the
statements themselves)-it is cheaply verifiable in the
laboratory or does not too dramatically change the
necessary relations between scientists and lab technicians,
for example.8 5 In this understanding:
the status of a statement depends on later statements. It is made
more of a certainty or less of a certainty depending on the next
sentence that takes it up; this retrospective attribution is repeated
83. This point shares a genealogy with rhetorical and discursive approaches
to law that predominate humanistic analyses of law where it suggests, in a
parallel way to critical and cultural legal studies, that there is a politics to the
seeming objectivity of scientific discourse and hence that rhetoric about and
representations of truth are an important aspect of the production of that truth.
See generally, GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT:
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999); POOVEY, supra note 38 (1998);
STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP: HOBBES,
BOYLE AND THE EXPERIMENTAL LIFE (1985); STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
TRUTH: CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (1994); THE
USES OF EXPERIMENT: STUDIES IN THE NATURAL SCIENCES (David Gooding, Trevor
J. Pinch & Simon Schaffer eds., 1989); Bruno Latour, Drawing Things Together,
in REPRESENTATION IN SCIENTIFIC PRACTICE 19 (Michael Lynch & Steve Woolgar
eds., 1990).
84. A "black box" in STS terminology is that which, although once contested,
has become part of the common sense of scientific practice such that it is just a
fact, no longer open for debate. See BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO
FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 2-3 (1987):
The word black box is used by cyberneticians whenever a piece of
machinery or a set of commands is too complex. In its place they draw
a little box about which they need to know nothing but its input and
output. As far as [the scientist] is concerned the double helix and the
machine [used to measure it] are two black boxes. That is, no matter
how controversial their history, how complex their inner workings, how
large the commercial or academic networks that hold them in place,
only their input and output count.
Id. See also Langdon Winner, Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding It
Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology, 18 SCI., TECH.,
AND HUM. VALUES 362, 362-78 (1993).
85. See THE RIGHT TOOLS FOR THE JOB: AT WORK IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LIFE
SCIENCES, supra note 37, at 20.
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for this next new sentence, which in turn might be made more of a
fact or more of a fiction by a third, and so on .... 86
From this point of view, we can see the rendering of a
debate between formalists and Realists in Conflicts as a
historical trajectory as a kind of "black box." The notion that
Realism succeeded formalism has now simply become an
accepted and undisputed fact. And, this fact subtly but
powerfully bolsters the view that the Realist position was
the more advanced, sophisticated, and modern of the two
approaches. From a Science Studies point of view, the
interesting question therefore becomes, how did the
Realists manage to enroll sufficient allies in their project to
render a political and epistemological dispute as a matter of
historical sequence in time-a mere "fact" beyond dispute?
As any teacher of Conflicts today knows all too well, of
course, this historical trajectory is not entirely settled: the
notion that Realism is simply more modern and more
advanced than formalism must be fought for pedagogically
in the classroom today. A careful combination of rhetorical
skill and authoritative pressure is required to convince
students that the history of Conflicts is the story of the
replacement of a backward and outdated theory with a
modern and technologically advanced alternative.
What is at stake in the pedagogy of this historical claim
is a fight over a second collection of claims about the
doability of formalist analysis. The performative authority
of the classroom must be deployed skillfully by the teacher
to demonstrate that one type of reasoning, formalist
reasoning, is incapable of producing coherent results, while
another type of reasoning, Realist reasoning, is doable.
From an STS point of view, a network of actants-argu-
ments about history and about doability, theories, teachers,
students, lawyers, judges, and restatements-that together
coalesce to make a certain view of the Conflicts Revolution
"'true."
Of course, as I indicated in the introduction, what
makes Conflicts intriguing at this moment is the renewed
sense of doubt about the "doability" of the Realist project.
86. LATOUR, supra note 84, at 27-28. The goal is "not to look for the intrinsic
qualities of any given statement but to look instead for all the transformations
it undergoes later in other hands." Id. at 59.
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With the resurgence of formalism across the legal academy
and on the bench, formalism is regaining appeal in
Conflicts as well. One lesson of the above discussion, as we
move in subsequent sections of this Essay to contemporary
arguments for a return to formalism in Conflicts, then, is
that we should be as suspicious of these recent claims about
relative "doability" of any approach over another, and be
willing to consider these as "collections of statements" on
par with those of an earlier era.
III. THE TECHNOSCIENCE METAPHOR
But Langdellian formalism was always as much a set of
metaphors as a set of doctrines. In particular, it was a
metaphorical vision of the legal project as a science.87 In
order to enroll sufficient allies to their cause, the Realists
therefore needed to do more than demolish the logic of
Beale's doctrinal claims. They needed to propose an
alternative set of metaphors that could displace the scien-
tific metaphors of formalism. In this Part, I argue that in
Conflicts, one of the ways Realism achieved its rhetorical
success was through the introduction of a very particular
set of metaphors into its collection of statements8 8 -meta-
phors of law as a tool, and of legal knowledge as a kind of
technoscience.
Today, the conception of law as a tool, as knowledge
with intended consequences that serves practical purposes,
is a taken-for-granted dimension of legal knowledge. And
yet if forced to reflect on it explicitly, most lawyers would
also acknowledge that it is foundational: it is what distin-
guishes legal knowledge from politics, or philosophy, in the
modern lawyer's self-understanding. In fact, these tool
metaphors have been black boxed in legal studies for so
long that it is difficult even for humanistic legal scholars to
hear them as metaphors or to imagine law in other terms.
87. See Robert W. Gordon, The Case for (and against) Harvard, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1231, 1239-40 (1995) (emphasizing the generalizing ambitions of the
scientific project); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
17 (1983) (describing Langdellian legal science as attune to geometry); Anthony
J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2084 (1995)
(arguing that Langdell's conception of legal science was borrowed from biology).
88. Cf. JOHN LAW, AIRCRAFT STORIES: DECENTERING THE OBJECT IN
TECHNOSCIENCE (2002).
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In later parts of this Essay, I will trace the
consequences and transformations of these technoscientific
metaphors. In this Part, I want to consider in more detail
their contours, uses, and effects as they were formulated by
Realist Conflicts scholars. My argument will be that the
metaphor of law as a technoscientific tool helped to enroll a
series of human and non-human allies to the Realist cause,
including in particular: (1) the legal tradition, by virtue of
its appeal to an implicit and yet already canonical frame of
reference in that tradition; (2) a wider Realist community,
by virtue of its shared terms of reference with classic
Realist themes; (3) a wider network of popular intellectual
thought by virtue of its invocation of key buzzwords of
American philosophical pragmatism; and most of all,
perhaps, (4) Conflicts scholars and practitioners
themselves, in the way it provided a vision of the
practitioner of Conflicts and his project, and a fantasy about
the practice of legal knowledge-an appealing method, and
aesthetic for law.
In the place of Beale's theory of vested rights, Cook
proposed a more pragmatic and practical, but equally
"scientific" approach to Conflicts doctrine. As he put it,
Realist critique "does not lead to the discarding of all
principles and rules, but quite the contrary. It demands
them as tools with which to work; as tools without which we
cannot work effectively." 89 The image here is of law as a
technical machine-not the machine of the classical era
disparaged by the Realists as "mechanical jurisprudence" 90
but the modern mass of inter-related parts that is the tool
of social and economic engineering. The lawyer and legal
scholar is likened to a kind of mechanic or engineer-an
expert to be sure, but a practically minded expert 91 focused
on the perfection of the workings of the machine.
In her work on artificial intelligence engineers, Diane
Forsythe describes the "engineering ethos" of her subjects
89. Cook, supra note 70, at 487.
90. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605
(1908).
91. Morton Horwitz has described how, for the Realists, modernity required
expertise, a "scientific" as opposed to a "legalist" mode of engagement. See
HORWITZ, supra note 50, at 216-21.
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as a tendency to approach things practically rather than
theoretically:
Faced with a problem, the Lab's knowledge engineers prefer to try
to solve it in a rough and ready way, refining the solution by trial
and error. When building an expert system, they say, it is better to
build a rapid prototype and see how it turns out than to map it out
exhaustively beforehand .... Performance is the criterion here.
9 2
Forsythe's description aptly captures Cook's vision of
legal project. Cook advocated a more modest, applied,
experimental vision of law, one grounded in practical,
hands-on problems. But if this new technoscience was
experimental, it was also fundamentally rational and
scientific. 93 Cook took great pains to emphasize, as against
what he termed the "mid-Victorian" understanding of
science, that modern science was not about actual certainty
but "warranted assertions" as in the nascent field of
probability theory.94 In the same way, legal reasoning
should be a kind of "scientific empiricism"-a combination
92. DIANA E. FORSYTHE, STUDYING THOSE WHO STUDY Us: AN
ANTHROPOLOGIST IN THE WORLD OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 44 (2001).
93. Dewey himself actually disputed Holmes' claim that the life of the law
was not logic but experience, and sought to rehabilitate logic from Realist
critique by casting legal rules as "working hypotheses" and "tools" which should
be constantly re-evaluated and modified as they encountered concrete facts,
means rather than ends. See 1 JOHN DEWEY, Logical Method and Law, in THE
ESSENTIAL DEWEY: PRAGMATISM, EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY 361 (Larry A. Hickman
& Thomas M. Alexander eds., 1998):
[Logical systematization] is an instrumentality, not an end. It is a
means of improving, facilitating, clarifying the inquiry that leads up to
concrete decisions; primarily that particular inquiry which has just
been engaged in, but secondarily, and of greater ultimate importance,
other inquiries directed at making other decisions in similar fields. ...
It is most important that rules of law should form as coherent and
generalized logical systems as possible. But these logical
systematizations of law in any field... with their reduction of a
multitude of decisions to a few general principles that are logically
consistent with one another, while they may be an end in itself for a
particular student, are clearly in last resort subservient to the
economical and effective reaching of decisions in particular cases.
Id. at 356.
94. Walter W. Cook, Walter Wheeler Cook, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 51, 51-52 (1941).
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of "radical empiricism, methodological rationalism, and
critical pragmatism. '95
Cook's analogies between the task of the lawyer and the
tasks of the modern scientist also pointed to a particular
vision of the lawyer and the legal scholar. Donna Haraway
has coined the phrase "modest witness" to describe the self-
image of the techno-scientist as a person who eschews
glamorous, high-profile scientific discoveries in favor of the
selfless task of providing for real needs (perfecting the
genetic modification of the Flavr-savrTM Tomato, for
example), and who imagines himself as a fortunate and
respectful witness to the awesome truths of science. 96 This
carefully disciplined modesty pervades Cook's vision of the
legal project as well.
This substitution of Beale's metaphors of pure science
for the metaphor of law as technoscientific tool or machine
drew a number of new human and non-human allies to the
cause of defeating the First Restatement in Conflicts. First,
and most simply, it marshaled the authority of Realist
scholars and Realist ideas from other areas of law. The
foregrounding of the tools of legal reasoning showcased a
wider Realist insight: that law was a tool-a means to an
end-in a more general sense. In Roscoe Pound's words:
Being scientific as a means to an end, [law] must be judged by the
results it achieves, not by the niceties of internal structure; it must
be valued by the extent to which it meets its end, not by the
beauty of its logical processes or the strictness with which its rules
proceed from the dogmas it takes as its foundation. 97
For Benjamin Cardozo, likewise, "[flew rules in our
time are so well established that they may not be called
upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to
an end."98 Karl Llewellyn'insisted that Realism demanded a
95. Id. at 57.
96. See generally Donna J. HARAwAY, MODESTWITNESS@SECOND_
MILLENNIUM. FEMALEMAN©_MEETSONOMOUSETM: FEMINISM AND TECHNO-
SCIENCE (1997). In Haraway's analysis, this technoscientist is gendered male;
she is interested in how ideas about the modesty of the scientific endeavor
necessitate the exclusion of the female from the scientific domain.
97. Pound, supra note 90, at 605.
98. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1st ed.
1921).
1004 [Vol. 53
CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW
''conception of law as a means to social ends and not as an
end in itself; so that any part needs constantly to be
examined for its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged
in the light of both and of their relation to each other."99
Hence the metaphor implicitly or powerfully indexed (and
hence brought into being) a political and intellectual
alliance between this doctrinal dispute and wider disputes
in the academy, the judiciary, and the political branches.
Yet if the technoscientific metaphor marshaled allies
from a larger battle between formalism and Realism,
paradoxically, it also indexed, in the way only metaphors
can,100 a somewhat contradictory idea of a wider unity of
legal scholars. In seizing on the language of means and
ends, Conflicts scholars were deploying a familiar legal tool
with a long doctrinal pedigree. 10 1 Indeed, Beale himself had
already demonstrated a commitment to this instrumental-
ist vision of law in his scholarship. 10 2 What was so powerful
about the metaphor of law as a tool, in other words, was
that Cook's claims for a "new" science of law notwithstand-
ing, the metaphor was already a kind of implicit given of
legal reasoning, and hence would have been received by
most trained lawyers, whatever their views of formalism, as
intuitively plausible.
In speaking of law as a means to an end, therefore, the
Realists were appealing to a longstanding American under-
standing of law as a tool, something that exists for a
purpose. This understanding was simply part of the taken-
for-granted machinery of legal argument, the apparatus
with which litigants, judges, politicians and academics
argued about what kind of tool government might be. In
99. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).
100. See ROY WAGNER, AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SUBJECT: HOLOGRAPHIC
WORLDVIEW IN NEW GUINEA AND ITS MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE WORLD
OF ANTHROPOLOGY (2001).
101. Since McCulloch v. Maryland, courts had evaluated the limits of
federal government authority by considering whether the act in question was a
legitimate means to an expressly authorized end. See McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (Marshall, J.) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
102. See Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, supra note 57.
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fact, Lochner v. New York itself, the paradigm of legal
formalism and beacon for Realist critique, was a decision
about the legitimate scope of governmental power premised
precisely on an analysis of the relationship of the means of
regulation to their stated ends. 103 The understanding of the
relationship between knowledge and its artifacts as a
relationship of means to ends was something lawyers
already shared with engineers and other technoscientists,
in other words. The reconfiguration of law as a tool, a
means to an end, therefore simply foregrounded a different
thread in the fabric of legal rhetoric. By foregrounding it, by
making it explicit, Cook and his cohort achieved the
remarkable feat of proposing an approach that seemed both
new and traditional at once.
The technoscientific metaphor also tapped into wider
cultural trends. Specifically, its explicit affinities with a
then popular philosophical tradition of thinking of
knowledge as a tool or an instrument with practical uses
103. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1905). Lochner era judges
had relied on a heightened scrutiny of the relations between the means and the
ends of government regulation to strike down state regulation as
unconstitutional encroachments on individual liberty interests. As the Lochner
Court put the argument:
The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and
the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be
held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual
to be free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his
own labor.
Id. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 524, 556 (1930) ("Unless we can
affirm that the end proposed is proper and the means adopted have reasonable
relation to it, this action is unjustifiable."); House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 282
(1911) (Harlan, J.) ("that such a power in the State... is the power to so
regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction so as to
guard the public morals, the public safety and the public health, as well as to
promote the public convenience and the common good; and that it is with the
State to devise the means to be employed to such ends, taking care always that
the means devised do not go beyond the necessities of the case, have some real
or substantial relation to the objects to be accomplished, and are not
inconsistent with its own constitution or the Constitution of the United
States."); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105 (1909) ("If the means employed,
pursuant to the statute, have no real, substantial relation to a public object
which government can accomplish; if the statutes are arbitrary and
unreasonable and beyond the necessities of the case; the courts will declare
their invalidity.").
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and consequences 104 drew into the battle between Cook and
Beale powerful allies from beyond the legal academy
altogether-it made this very discrete doctrinal dispute
about something much larger. The pragmatist philosophical
tradition, with its anti-foundationalist understanding of
truth as the outcome of purposeful social practice, 105 had
long sought to displace abstract philosophical questions
with practical questions of means and ends. 10 6  The
pragmatist dogma was that in confronting an analytical
problem, "we start in the middle" and work out the ends of
knowledge by reasoning through the means. 0 7
Perhaps most importantly of all, the technoscientific
metaphor also implied a kind of knowledge-a "technical"
way of doing Conflicts-and a pitch for how addressing
Conflicts problems could be engaging intellectual activity
rather than dreary and esoteric doctrinal work. Cook's
104. See Thomas C. Grey, What Good is Legal Pragmatism?, in PRAGMATISM
IN LAW AND SOCIETY 9 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); POSNER,
supra note 3. On the influence of pragmatism on legal realism, see generally
HORWITZ, supra note 50; SCHLEGEL, supra note 55. As Cornell West has put it,
the core of pragmatism consists in "a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries
to deploy thought as a weapon to enable more effective action." CORNEL WEST,
THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 5 (1989).
In William James' words, "The pragmatic method... is to try to interpret each
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it
practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?"
William James, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM AND CLASSICAL
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: ESSENTIAL READINGS AND INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 193, 194
(John J. Stuhr ed., 2d ed. 2000).
105. Holmes was an erratic participant in the so-called "metaphysical club"
where Peirce, James and others developed the ideas that later came to be
known as pragmatism, and his prediction theory of law bears the imprint of
Peirce's instrumentalist, effect-centered understanding of meaning. See
CHARLES S. PEIRCE, CHANCE, LOVE, AND LOGIC: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 45 (1949).
On Holmes' pragmatism, see Parker, supra note 29; see also Edward J.
Bloustein, Holmes: His First Amendment Theory and His Pragmatist Bent, 40
RUTGERS L. REV. 283 (1988); Note, Holmes, Peirce and Legal Pragmatism, 84
YALE L.J. 1123 (1975).
106. Cf. S. MORRIS EAMES, PRAGMATIC NATURALISM 90-91 (1977).
107. Frank X. Ryan, Five Milestones of Pragmatism, in DEWEY, PRAGMATISM,
AND ECONOMIC METHODOLOGY 15, 18 (Elias L. Khalil ed., 2004); see also 2 JOHN
DEWEY, Importance, Significance, and Meaning, in THE ESSENTIAL DEWEY:
ETHICS, LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 93, at 216; 1 THE ESSENTIAL DEWEY:
PRAGMATISM, EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY, supra note 93; 2 JOHN DEWEY, Valuation
and Experimental Knowledge, in THE ESSENTIAL DEWEY: ETHICS, LOGIC,
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 93, at 273; Grey, supra note 104, at 14-15.
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assertions that what made the new technoscience of law
scientific was a more precise definition of the relationship of
means to ends conveyed intellectual excitement. The
chaotic, continually changing nature of social ends could be
accommodated and even embraced by a highly rationalized
means-ends framework: "an application of scientific
methods to the field of 'values' . . . will make our choice of
'ends' 'more intelligent, better grounded, less subject to
caprice."' 08 It was this rational stability of the means-ends
relationship that allowed (legal) means to define (political
and social) ends as much as ends to define means, in Cook's
view. Thinking through all the technicalities of means-ends
relations was to be the job of the smart (but modest) lawyer,
the expert technoscientist of the law.
If we accept that scientific or legal truths are a
collection of statements, then we can also see that the
technical dimensions of science or law are not so much
artifacts of the inherently complex or technical nature of
scientific or legal problems as they are a part of the
rhetorical strategy of getting one's own collection of
statements black boxed as truth. As Latour puts it, "When
controversies flare up the literature becomes technical."'10 9
Yet what needs to be accounted for is why this technical
analysis would have had the appeal that it did in Conflicts.
What was the pleasure of solving Conflicts problems by
thinking through the rationalized relationship of means
and ends ? In order to answer this question, we will need to
turn to ethnographic materials. That is the subject of Part
V. But first, I want to trace what happened to the powerful
metaphor of law as a tool as it shifted, with the success of
the Realist Revolution, from a "collection of statements" to a
simple "fact" about the law.
IV. THE LITERALIZATION OF A METAPHOR
By mid-century, the Realist revolution was in full
swing, as courts in one jurisdiction after another abandoned
the First Restatement and developed new doctrines
inspired by Realist approaches. But in the aftermath of this
doctrinal reform, a new kind of project emerged, a project
108. Cook, supra note 94, at 59 (quoting Dewey).
109. LATOUR, supra note 84, at 30.
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defined by a problem: how to turn the theoretical insights of
Realism into a tool for resolving actual choice of law
disputes. In this Part, I trace how the Realist insight about
the instrumental nature of law was itself fashioned into an
actual instrument, a machine of its own. In the hands of
mid-century Conflicts scholars, I argue, the metaphor-the
idea that law was a tool-became, quite literally, a tool of
legal knowledge. Drawing on insights in the anthropology of
knowledge, I describe this remarkable but little-noticed
ontological development-the transformation of a metaphor
into an object. I argue that this doctrinal development is
best understood as a transformation of legal form, a process
I call "literalization." I suggest that this actualization, or
mechanization of Realist metaphors as a kind of "aesthetic
practice" has proven far more durable than the ideology of
Realism itself.
A. Problem-solving
At mid-century, the goal of Conflicts scholars was to
offer rationalizing "frameworks" for the evaluation of
Conflicts problems of the same grand scale, if not the same
epistemological content, as Beale's own. The goal was to
systematize, to organize. This goal is epitomized by the
production of a Second Restatement, the very kind of
project that Cook and his colleagues had ridiculed. 110 The
figure who best embodies the mid-century turn in Conflicts
doctrine is Brainerd Currie.11 ' Currie is best known for
introducing to Conflicts the concept of "governmental
110. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971). The
Second Restatement in fact preserves many of the rules of the First
Restatement (although the influence of the pragmatic epistemological stance is
also evident in the softening of these rules from hard rules to rebuttable
presumptions). See id.
111. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963). Currie began teaching law at Mercer University immediately after
graduation from that faculty in 1935. Prior to law school he had received only a
junior college degree. After further study at Columbia Law School from 1940-41
and a period of work in government during the war, he joined the Duke law
faculty in 1946. He taught for several years at the University of California at
Los Angeles, served as dean of the University of Pittsburgh law school for
almost a decade, and then returned to Duke in 1961 where he taught until his
death in 1965. See Elvin R. Latty, Brainerd Currie-Five Tributes, 1966 DUKE
L.J. 2.
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interests"'112 and the "false conflicts" methodology, in which
the judge was to examine competing laws in light of the
interests they served in order to determine which State had
an interest in the application of its law. Both were almost
universally adopted in one form or another by scholars
writing during this period. Currie's work will serve as an
example of the mid-century approach to Conflicts in this
Part.
Currie the mid-century man was almost the archetypal
antithesis of Walter Wheeler Cook. A rural Southerner, he
graduated from a local junior college, attended law school at
a local university, excelled, and immediately joined its law
faculty. Although he later pursued further studies, he
lacked Cook's erudite sophistication and elite academic
affiliations. Throughout his career, "his essential role was
that of a teacher."113 Those who knew him claimed that
although mild-mannered, he could be antagonistic toward
the kind of legal scholar he disparaged as "the modern
intellectual."' 1 4
Currie's doctrinal approach to Conflicts was self-
consciously technocratic. The contribution of mid-century
Conflicts scholars, in Currie's words, was "a new
112. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the
Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 733 (1963); Elliott E.
Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
959 (1952); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True
Rules," 49 CAL. L. REV. 240 (1961).
113. Philip B. Kurland, Brainerd Currie-Five Tributes, 1966 DUKE L.J. 5;
see also Elvin R. Latty, Brainerd Currie-Five Tributes, 1966 DUKE L.J. 2.
Kurland was a co-author of Currie's. See Kurland, supra. He taught at the
University of Chicago Law School. See id.
114. Phillip Kurland quotes a limerick Currie wrote that seems in its
criticisms almost tailor-made for Cook:
I am the very model of a modern intellectual;
I know the ruddy answers though I'm rather ineffectual.
I'm more sophisticated, son, than people clad in denim are:
When I have nothing much to say, I say it in a seminar.
I have a little paper on some matters psychological;
The highest court knows less than I of subjects pedagogical;
I know which books are best to read, which symphonies are better.
Ah! I'm very well informed upon aesthetics and et cetera.
I know a thing or two about the sciences behavioral-
To which to foster, fellows stout, you sacrificed and gave your all.
Id. at 8.
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technology."'1 15 Currie described his contribution as the
mere rationalization of Conflicts methodology, a
meticulously value-neutral scheme. It was a machine with
the limited purpose of eradicating what he called
"irrationality": its only contribution lay in showing how "the
false problems created by [Conflicts] rules may be solved in
a quite irrational way-e.g., by defeating the interest of one
state without advancing the interest of another."1 6 Where"real conflicts" between the laws of two states were at
stake, Currie disclaimed all expertise on grounds that such
cases were "a job for a legislative committee." 11
7
Currie laid out a "basic method" for resolving Conflicts
problems consisting of five steps, which he listed in the
technical style of numbered paragraphs:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign factors, a court
should as a matter of course look to the law of the forum as the
source of the rule of decision.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state, rather
than the law of the forum, should furnish the rule of decision, the
court should first of all determine the governmental policy . . .
expressed by the law of the forum. The court should then inquire
whether the relation of the forum state to the case at bar-that is,
to the parties, to the transaction, to the subject matter, to the
litigation-is such as to bring the case within the scope of the
state's governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for
the assertion that the state has an interest in the application of its
policy in this instance.
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy
expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has a
legitimate interest in the application of that policy to the case at
bar.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the
application of its law and policy, but that the foreign state has
such an interest, it should apply the foreign law.
115. Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 754, 755 (1963).
116. Currie, supra note 48, at 174.
117. Id. at 176-77.
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5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the
application of its law and policy, it should apply the law of the
forum .... 118
From the perspective of Currie and his colleagues,
however, the greatest innovation of this technology over
early Realist "theories" was an explicit focus on problem
solving. Although mid-century Conflicts scholars paid
tribute to their Realist forbearers' critique of formalism, 119
their project, they insisted, was differently situated. Currie
criticizes the Conflicts revolutionaries for their
"destructive" attitude and their failure to "advance
solutions,"120 and positions himself, in contrast to their
"disillusionment," as a constructive problem-solver:
[I]t is unlikely that congressional action will be forthcoming . . .
unless the energies which are now consumed by the metaphysics
and the frustrations of conflict of laws are diverted to the
formulation and justification of specific legislative programs. Here
is challenge enough. Here is the "grand objective' in an attainable,
or at least approachable, form.
12 1
Crucial here is the question of audience: Where Cook's
scholarship was oriented primarily toward fellow academics
within and without the legal academy, mid-century
Conflicts scholarship, in contrast, is scholarship for the
judge. Commenting on the practical difficulties associated
with applying modern Conflicts doctrines, Currie wrote:
We do not, however, despair. We turn, instead, to the
resources of jurisprudence, placing our faith primarily in the
judges rather than the lawmakers. The judicial function is not
narrowly confined; we indulge the hope that it may even be equal
118. Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9-10
(1958-59).
119. See Currie, supra note 115, at 754 (describing the first Restatement as
"rigid, theoretical, and vastly oversimplified").
120. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 227 (1958).
121. Id. at 267-68 (citation omitted) (quoting Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic
Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297, 312 (1953)).
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to the ambitious task of bringing uniformity and certainty into a
world whose conflicts political action has failed to resolve.
12 2
Currie devotes a full chapter of his book to the
celebration of the contributions of Judge Traynor in a way
that would have been inconceivable for Cook to do. 123 If the
Realist insight was that law is a tool, by mid-century it is
clear whose tool the law is. There is a clear protagonist,
now: the judge as a man of his tools.
This is apparent also in the form of academic argument.
Where Cook's writing took the form of a close reading of
Beale's text followed by a wider theoretical discussion, mid-
century Conflicts articles largely take the form of
discussions of actual or hypothetical cases 124 presented as
puzzles or problems to be resolved by the scholar.
As the aesthetics of the presentation would suggest,
Currie's approach celebrated a mechanistic form of
reasoning. The engineer's skill for Currie inhered in a
willingness to simplify, to think in a technical and outcome-
oriented way. Currie dismissed earlier Realist critiques of
mechanical styles of reasoning with the comment that
although he was "mindful" that some would view his
approach as a reductive definition of the relevant facts in a
Conflicts problem, "one cannot very well begin a chess game
with a stalemate."'125 And as the Restatement project
122. Currie, supra note 48, at 173.
123. See CURRIE, supra note 111, at 629-89.
124. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 65; Brainerd Currie, Conflict, Crisis and
Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1. On the epistemology and aesthetics
of the hypothetical form, see Annelise Riles, Encountering Amateurism: John
Henry Wigmore and the Uses of American Formalism, in RETHINKING THE
MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAw (Annelise Riles ed., 2001).
125. CURRIE, supra note 111, at 83 n.14. Latour points out in the scientific
context that the act of ignoring another scientist's theory, or of treating it as
just plain irrational, is a far more effective means of defeating it than is
contesting it on the merits:
Irrationality is always an accusation made by someone building a
network over someone else who stands in the way; thus, there is no
Great Divide between minds, but only shorter and longer networks;
harder facts are not the rule but the exception, since they are needed
only in a very few cases to displace others on a large scale out of their
usual ways.
LATOUR, supra note 84, at 259.
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further suggests, this mid-century reductiveness was also
self-consciously lawyerly; the instrument at hand was now
an explicitly legal instrument. 126 Currie insists again and
again that Conflicts questions can best be resolved by
thinking about them in traditional legal terms, as run-of-
the-mill cases of statutory interpretation.
In the aftermath of the Realists' own negation of the
autonomy of law as a discipline, therefore, the technical
analysis of means and ends became its own disciplining
force. 127 Unlike the Realists' metaphorical invocations of
expertise and scientism, with their claims that the law was
rational because it was like technoscience, mid-century
Conflicts scholarship performed its own technicality.
28 It
was this performance of the technical that recast the
Realist slogan that law was a means to an end as some-
thing more than a theory; it became a way of doing legal
analysis. In Currie's hands, the ideology that law is a
means to an end actually became, literally, a means to an
end-a means to the concrete end of solving Conflicts
problems without abandoning a Realist epistemology.
How should we think about this strange turn of events
in Conflicts-about the curious transformation of the
Realist ideology that law should be tool-like into an actual
tool of its own? There are three stories that late twentieth-
century scholars might tell about the way the ideology of
tools became a tool of its own. The first would view these
events as an exemplification of the fact that standards-
based approaches invariably metamorphose into rule-based
approaches. 29 From this perspective, Cavers, Lorenzen and
Cook's more open-ended Conflicts methodology was
destined to evolve into more mechanistic rules over time.
30
Eight years after Cook first published his ideas, Cavers
took the point even further to chastise his Realist
126. See, e.g., ERNST RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAwS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
638 (1945).
127. See generally LATOUR, supra note 84; LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note
32; PICKERING, supra note 42.
128. Cf. AUSTIN, supra note 46; BUTLER, supra note 46.
129. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
130. As Joseph Singer has put this argument, the choice between rules and
standards in conflicts itself is a "false conflict." Singer, supra note 16, at 5.
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colleagues for once again falling prey to the very legalistic
thinking they had critiqued: "[Realist Conflicts proposals]
are still harnessed to the old task of devising (or justifying)
rules for selecting the appropriate jurisdiction whose law
should govern in a given case. Like the forms of action, in
Maitland's telling phrase, the territorial and vested rights
theories rule us from the grave."
1 31
But in point of fact, the transition from Cook to Currie
was not a transition from standards-based forms of legal
analysis to rule-based forms of analysis; it was a transition
from an approach that foregrounded theory to one that
foregrounded problem-solving.132 On the relative merits of
rules versus standards there was little disagreement
between Cook and Currie. Although mid-century ap-
proaches shared a more mechanistic aesthetic, this did not
mean that they were actually more rule-oriented than early
twentieth-century approaches. Currie's Conflicts method-
ology in fact represents the epitome of standards-based
adjudication. It would be for a later generation of Conflicts
scholars to reject earlier modern approaches as too
standards-based and to propose instead a new set of
rules. 133
A second story legal scholars might tell about these
events would assert that an interdisciplinary, academic
discourse of critique such as Cook's was destined to give
way to a more traditionally legalistic way of thinking as
youthful critics became senior legal scholars, judges and
deans. This is a story about the hegemony of legal dis-
course: If one wishes to be accepted as a legal scholar, one
must adopt the language of law, the argument goes. Cavers
himself describes his move away from the critiques of his
youth to his mid-century "principles of preference" approach
in these terms:
With the brashness of youth ... I insisted ... that these questions
could not be answered as long as the questioners continued to seek
what I termed "a jurisdiction-selecting" rule ....
131. Cavers, supra note 65, at 178.
132. See Posnak, supra note 47; Sedler, supra note 47; Seidelson, supra note
47.
133. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The
Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991).
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* . . As I explored these problems, the choice-of-law problems I
had dealt with in my 1933 article began to shrink. Did it really
matter whether one view or another prevailed in a field where law
review articles and comments greatly outnumbered important
judicial decisions?...
This attitude was accentuated by World War II's challenges to
legal creativity. As far as conflict of laws was concerned, I became
"a tired progressive"; more aptly, perhaps, a "tired realist."134
It is clearly the case that mid-century conflicts analysis
was performed in a lawyerly genre. If Cook backgrounded
his debts to legal practice, Currie and his colleagues, in
contrast, clearly foregrounded theirs. Yet this is not to say
that the move from Cook's critiques of formalism to Currie's
Conflicts methodology was a move from an extra-legal
vocabulary to a legal one. As we saw, the Realist ideology of
instrumentalism, the idea of law as a means to an end,
represented not a position outside the law, but a powerful
implicit appeal to the legal tradition. 135 The story of the co-
opting of outsiders to the law into insiders does not do
justice to the way the Realists' outsider position was always
already built from within.
A third story would cast the technocratic turn in mid-
century Conflicts as a consequence of wider changes in law
and politics-of the closure of a space for creative
experimentation in the legal academy as a consequence of
changes in mid-century American political culture. A
different version of this outside explanation of legal failure
would emphasize political or economic interests to suggest
that tools disappear or evolve when they cease to be useful
to those in a position to use them. 136 Certainly, doctrinal
developments in Conflicts had a relationship to the wider
fascination with institutional settlement in postwar legal
scholarship, such as the process school. 37
134. DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 8-10 (1965).
135. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., P.A. McNuTT, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE (1996).
137. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW (1958); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and
Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS li (William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Frickey eds.,
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Latter-day versions of this argument attribute
transformations in the law to either a new condition of
globalization or a new information economy. 138  Cook
himself at times resorted to a version of this external
explanation of legal change where he suggested that the
failure of the First Restatement was attributable to its
inability to adapt to the new scale of complexity of the
modern world: "Just as in physics, chemistry and biology
today's theories are much more complex than those current
in the Victorian period, so in the field of legal science
theories if they are to be adequate must take account of the
complexities of modern social economic life.'
13 9
Against this external view, Paul Kahn has suggested a
much more internal account of the transformations of law:
Unlike scientific thought, old paradigms do not disappear in legal
thought. They remain available for use, but become subthemes as
new conceptual structures gain dominance. The catalyst for
paradigm shifts in constitutional theory is not a dissonance
between theory and fact-there are no facts of the matter in this
field-but rather recognition of the internal incoherence of each
paradigm. Paradigms shift when there is a sort of exhaustion of
conceptual resources, i.e. when constitutional theory confronts a
1994). Gary Peller has argued that a new conception of law emerged during this
period in which:
The legitimacy of law would not turn on the resolution of [questions
about] the content of legal doctrine. Instead, ... the fifties legal
scholars believed that it was possible to distinguish legitimate and
illegitimate exercises of official power while simultaneously
transcending the centuries-old debate between positivism and natural
law, between the 'is' and the 'ought' of legal criticism, through the
adoption of a new perspective, one that focused attention on the
question whether a particular decision was the 'duly arrived at result'
of 'duly established procedures' for resolving disputes of that kind.
Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561, 569
(1988).
138. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Internet: The Architecture of Privacy, 1
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 56 (1999).
139. Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 37 ILL. L. REV. 418, 423 (1943). This claim
has been refuted by some analyses that suggest that vested rights doctrines can
be preferable in economic terms to modern approaches. See, e.g., Michael E.
Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV.
49 (1989).
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problem generated by, and unresolvable within, an existing
paradigm.
140
Although I do not deny the importance of external
explanations, like Kahn I want to draw attention to other,
more often-neglected internal dimensions of legal
knowledge. In particular, I am interested in those aspects of
legal knowledge practices that are so obvious and
ubiquitous that they escape the attention of both legal
practitioners and their humanistically-oriented critics.
But this poses a problem for scholarship: how to
describe what is so obvious and fundamental that it
becomes imperceptible? In my case, this is where
ethnography comes in. The project of ethnography is to
make what is so taken for granted that it becomes invisible,
what is so commonplace that it falls beneath the radar
screen, accessible as a theoretical subject. 141 I turn, there-
fore, to my own ethnographic experience of initiating law
students into the practice of mid-century Conflicts problem-
solving.
B. Means and Ends: An Ethnographic Vignette
Mid-century Conflicts is taught as a series of
hypotheticals that ask the student to position herself in the
role of the problem-solving judge. Consider for example the
experience of teaching and learning Currie's false conflicts
methodology with a hypothetical I use in class:
Two Californian domiciliaries are registered with
California's domestic partnership registry. Upon the death
of one partner without a will, the other files a claim in
California to inherit a tract of land in Georgia owned by the
deceased. The California courts have recognized such
inheritance rights as required by California law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In
Georgia, by contrast, there is no domestic partnership
registry and no law prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation; in fact, a 1996 law explicitly states
140. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 88 (1999).
141. I have written about this use of ethnography in another context. See
ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2000).
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that "it is declared to be the public policy of this state to
recognize the unity only of man and woman." 142 Had the
partner brought the claim in Georgia, a court there would
have rejected it. Ms. X, you are the California judge hearing
this case. Should you apply California law, and allow the
plaintiff to inherit the property, or should you defer to
Georgia law?
The law students who take Conflicts are comfortable
with this exercise and quickly manipulate the doctrine
towards problem-solving ends. Ms. X will first "spot the
issue": she will point out that under the old territorial
approach, the law of the place of the situs of the property
would govern and so the court would apply Georgia law
since that is where the land is located. If I have chosen the
right student, she will then quickly identify the puzzle: this
result does not seem "fair" to her. I then lead her through a
series of further questions and answers:
"Ms. X, what purpose does the California law serve?"
Ms. X is likely to say that California law is aimed at
treating its citizens equally regardless of sexual orientation.
"And what about Georgia law?"
She will remember that I mentioned that the Georgia
legislature has stated that the law aims to affirm
heterosexual marriage and to discourage other forms of
partnership. What I am leading Ms. X to do here, in other
words, is to think about each of these laws as a means to
some end. In the dialogue, the insight that law is a means
to an end becomes a tool of problem-solving-law should be
a means to an end-that in turn implies a prior question to
be answered on the way to solving the problem: what is the
end of these particular laws? How exactly Ms. X reaches
this answer is not entirely clear, and I do not provide her
with any guidance on how to do so. 143
Our interest at this point is in solving the problem. We
will attempt to operationalize the Realist view of law as a
stable and rational relationship of means to ends to answer
the question at hand:
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(a) (2001).
143. Robert Summers points out that in most instrumentalist reasoning, the
goals or ends remain largely undefined. ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 62 (1982).
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"Ms. X, is it reasonable to assume that when the
California legislature passed this law, it wished to protect
persons like the plaintiff?
Yes, she will say.
"What about Georgia-is it reasonable to assume that
Georgia intended to condemn relationships like the
plaintiffs relationship with the deceased?"
Under pressure from me, the students will ultimately
agree that Georgia has an interest in the moral climate in
Georgia, but not in what goes on in California, and hence
cannot "rationally" claim an interest in this plaintiff and
her domestic relations. Therefore, we will conclude that
California law should apply to the case. If the students
accept the reasoning, we have performed a stunning
technical feat: we have reconciled fundamentally opposed
political positions on a divisive social question, at least as it
is expressed in the dispute between this hypothetical
plaintiff and defendant. We have done so by redefining the
ends (what the purpose of Georgia law might be) by
thinking through the means-Georgia law and its
application to these parties.
If the Realist critique sought to explain legal knowledge
practices by showing how means were a function of ends
beyond the law, in other words, what the students learn in
this exercise in mid-century Conflicts analysis is that the
resolution of Conflicts problems requires understanding
social ends as defined, limited, and even constituted by
legal means. Legal knowledge defines its own outside from
the point of view of the inside even as it is presented as a
"function" of other interests.
If this remarkable act of legal engineering, this
displacement of social and political controversy by doctrinal
manipulation, seems a step removed from the Realist
insistence that legal tools exist only to serve social ends, we
saw that ideologically, at least, this was already a tenet of
Realist dogma. Cook himself suggested, following Dewey, 4 4
that ends should be redefined through the process of
thinking through the means. The stunning innovation lies
not in the substance of the claim, or in the philosophical or
144. Cf. 2 JOHN DEWEY, The Place of Habit in Conduct, in THE ESSENTIAL
DEWEY: ETHICS, LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 93, at 24.
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legal basis of the method, therefore. The innovation lies in
the mechanistic genre of the argument. No wonder that the
image of law as a kind of machine, and of engineering as a
model for legal knowledge, continues to elicit our lawyerly
commitments.145
C. Literalization: A Transformation of Form
With the help of this vignette, we can begin to see
something quite remarkable in the mid-century doctrinal
"rationalizations" in Conflicts. In mid-century, a theory
became a kind of machine. That is, mid-century Conflicts
methods were exercises in turning the insight that law is a
means to an end itself into a means to an end-a means of
resolving Conflicts problems. To assert that legal knowl-
edge is a tool, as the Realists did, is very different than to
actually use the theory that knowledge is a tool as a tool of
its own, as my students learned to do in the episode I have
described. And yet this was precisely Currie's innovation.
Currie and his cohort transformed Realist theoretical
insights about the tool-like quality of law quite literally into
a set of tools. In the hands of the mid-century Conflicts
scholar, a theory, a metaphor, a "collection of statements"-
the rallying cry that law is a tool-became something of a
very different order, that is, an actual tool of its own. It is at
this point, the point at which the ends of legal knowledge
could become the means of further legal work, that ideas
could become tools, that law departs from the humanities
and social sciences and actually becomes a species of
technoscience.
That a theory could become a machine is a quite
astounding fact. It would be as if a theory that law is a
language became a language of its own. And yet the
innovation remains imperceptible to legal theorists largely
because the difference between the Realist and mid-century
positions is not a theoretical difference (the Realists had
already championed the notion that law was (like) a tool),
but instead a difference in the form and in the performative
character of law. Precisely because at a theoretical (if not at
145. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 3; cf. MICHAEL FOLEY, LAWS, MEN AND
MACHINES: MODERN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE APPEAL OF NEWTONIAN
MECHANICS (1990); ALEXANDER E. SILVERMAN, MIND, MACHINE, AND METAPHOR:
AN ESSAY ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL REASONING (1993).
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a performative) level, the Realists had argued that
knowledge was a tool, the difference between the two
positions easily escapes humanistic and critical theorizing.
Hence the relative paucity of humanistic and critical theory
about mid-century law, despite the mountains of mono-
graphs and articles about the Realist revolution.
And yet I want to suggest that what Currie and his
cohort were up to is something that the cultural study of
law is uniquely qualified to understand. What was really at
stake here was a transformation of legal form in which a
metaphor-law is like a tool, law is like a machine-was
"literalized" in order to become the tool of further
knowledge.
In his theories of metaphor, the anthropologist Roy
Wagner has described the workings of metaphor in terms of
what he calls the "obviation" of symbolic practices. When
symbols are used in new ways, symbols are differentiated
from their "context"-from the semiotic milieu in which
they are grounded. In this process, they become what he
terms "symbols that stand for themselves," that is, material
objects. 146 Wagner's work revolutionized the anthropology of
knowledge where it demonstrated convincingly that the
"objects" one sees as material, and hence different in kind
from "representations," are in fact the effects of particular
objectifying symbolic practices. Hence the "natural" bound-
ary between metaphorical and material realities is itself an
effect of symbolic obviation.
It is possible to understand doctrinal developments in
Conflicts as classic examples of obviation in Wagner's
terms: an internal transformation of symbolic form
produces, as its symbolic effect, an "actual" tool out of a
metaphorical one. I propose that we understand the move
from Cook to Currie as a transformation of legal form of
this kind. Indeed, it is only from this point of view that we
could take seriously Currie's claims to stand both as heir to
Cook's Realist insights and as a displacement of them.
Wagner's work focused on symbolic practices in cultural
contexts far afield from modernist American law. But in her
work on mid-century modernism in the social sciences, the
anthropologist Marilyn Strathern brings this approach to
146. See generally ROY WAGNER, SYMBOLS THAT STAND FOR THEMSELVES 26
(1975).
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bear on modernist intellectual traditions. In Strathern's
vocabulary, the literalization of previously metaphorical
conceptual relations, a process of "making explicit" the
implicit, agreed bases and practices of the working of
knowledge, is a core modernist analytical move. 147 It is also
a hallmark of pragmatism. She notes: "[pragmatists] love
the literal-minded. Their fantasies are about 'the real
world'--only clear away the assumptions and you will get to
the truth; only clear away the constructions and you will
get to the facts."148 Strathern's description of the modernist
pragmatist penchant for making the implicit workings of
knowledge explicit aptly captures Currie's systematizing
and rationalizing efforts, his numbered lists of the steps in
the production of legal knowledge, and helps to see how
these seemingly mundane practices could have effectuated
such a fundamental shift from metaphors to literalizations.
From this perspective, we can see the notion of state
interests as the literalization of the Realist understanding
that laws have instrumental uses, and again that Conflicts
scholarship itself should be an instrumental means to an
end.
Following Wagner and Strathern, we can understand
these mid-century transformations in Conflicts doctrine as
part of a larger transformation. As we saw, the Realists'
replacement of the vocabulary of vested rights with a
technoscientific vocabulary of means and ends was hardly a
move away from legal knowledge. Doctrines of vested rights
and of means and ends had long been alternatives to one
another, variations from within a singular form. 149 Hence
Cook's innovation represented an appeal to a different
strand, a backgrounded dimension of legal form, rather
than a position outside legal form altogether. The position
"outside" the law assumed by the Realists was a position
that was already defined from inside the legal tradition. In
Wagner's terms, then, the movement from Beale to Cook to
Currie represents successive steps or stages in the obviation
of legal form.
147. MARILYN STRATHERN, AFTER NATURE: ENGLISH KINSHIP IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 7 (1992).
148. Id.
149. Cf. Annelise Riles, Law as Object, in LAW & EMPIRE IN THE PACIFIC: FIJI
AND HAWAII 187, 190 (Sally Engle Merry & Donald Brenneis eds., 2003).
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That mid-century Conflicts scholarship represented any
kind of a break with the early Realist project would not
have been immediately apparent because at the level of
ideology, of the substance of the arguments, there was
much continuity between Realist and mid-century ap-
proaches. The mid-century focus on state interests retains
and indeed amplifies the Realist faith in technoscientific
managerialism. Likewise, the idea of state interests at the
heart of Currie's methodology explicitly builds on the
Realist understanding of law as a tool discussed in the
previous Part. In order to determine whether a state had a
legitimate interest in a dispute, in Currie's program, it was
necessary to think of each law as a tool of state power, to
ask, what are its purposes, and then to ask whether these
purposes rationally applied to the given fact pattern. The
problem-solving orientation of the mid-century approach is,
in many ways, more pragmatic still than the Realists' own.
As in early Realist writings, the judge at the center of mid-
century Conflicts texts is not a politician or a philosopher
but an engineer engaged in a complex but crucial manage-
rial task. Currie presents his innovation as simply an
application, an act of taking the Realist insights and
thinking about them practically.
I want to suggest that this literalization of Realist
metaphors had such a profound impact in Conflicts pre-
cisely because it escaped the attention of legal scholars,
practitioners, and judges at the time as well; it simply did
not become a subject of explicit debate.
D. A Humanistic Account of the Conflicts Muddle
Yet it remains to be explained why Currie's literaliza-
tion of Realist metaphors achieved the rhetorical and
practical success that they did, and why, conversely, this
approach now would be so frequently described by Conflicts
scholars as a "dismal swamp." As mentioned at the outset,
what makes Conflicts such an interesting example of the
apotheosis of technocracy is that it is a field that seems to
have failed in the eyes of its own practitioners. Why would
this be so? If Currie's solution was once hailed as a panacea,
why is it so assailed today?
Here, I want to return to the ethnographic vignette
presented above to focus on the experience of "doing"
Conflicts knowledge. Diane Forsythe describes the
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"technical orientation" of the engineers she studied as an
"intellectual style" that would be most recognizable to
lawyers and legal scholars: 150
On the one hand, they are inclined to think of technical matters as
posing interesting problems. In contrast, social matters are not
conceived as problematic in an important way. This is not to
suggest that social phenomena may not be troublesome-indeed,
they often are ... but they are not thought of as interesting.
1 51
Forsythe points to an aspect of knowledge that Wagner
and Strathern leave unexplored: the question of the
capacity of expert tools to generate interest. I now explore
this aspect of the mid-century methodology a bit further
with help of the above vignette.
The point at which students first learn to resolve false
conflicts is invariably one of their favorite moments in the
Conflicts course. We are playing a game-I provide puzzles
and the students respond enthusiastically by solving them.
The form of the dialogue is highly structured and yet open;
it invites their participation. The game in this particular
hypothetical involves a friendly back-and-forth between
myself and Ms. X which, as enjoyed by other students now
cast into the role of observers, establishes a partnership, a
shared community of problem solvers.
Since Currie himself compared the act of solving a
Conflicts problem to the experience of playing a chess
game, 152 it might be useful to think a bit further about how
games capture their players' interest. Erving Goffman long
ago argued that in order for a game to enlist participants'
interest and commitment, it had to have certain well-
defined and formal qualities. First, the play had to be
sufficiently predictable with reference to a given set of
rules, but it also had to be sufficiently contingent such that
the performance, the play event, would channel
participants' interest toward the small variations possible
within a given form. 153 Second, a successful game had to
150. FORSYTHE, supra note 92, at 45.
151. Id. at 44.
152. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
153. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS: Two STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
INTERACTION 35 (1961).
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delineate the sphere of play, what he termed "mutual
focused activity," from the outside world by demanding that
players agree to certain "rules of irrelevance" whereby they
would not bring certain aspects of their shared experience
to the table. And yet, at the same time, success or skill
within the game would have to depend on the deployment of
certain skills used in the outside world as well (intelligence,
luck, memory), such that the game would speak meta-
phorically about life beyond its own well-defined
parameters.154
Goffman's description captures the performative
success of the false conflicts puzzle for law students. It is a
puzzle that requires inventiveness and yet ultimately can
be quite easily mastered; one that gestures beyond its own
parameters by suggesting that real policy issues are at
stake in this hypothetical plaintiff's dispute with this
hypothetical defendant, while demanding also that partici-
pants agree to strict rules of irrelevance concerning what
dimensions of the litigants' lives or their relationships to
particular communities can be introduced.
Where most observers of the Socratic method have
associated it with the indoctrination of students into a
formalist legal ideology, 155 the ideology at issue in
Conflicts-here, the resolution of false conflicts-is prag-
matic and managerial. And yet, just as with the Socratic
manipulations of Langdellian formalism, to the students,
the game appeals precisely in the way it "feels" like law.
What Currie has done, in other words, is to give us prag-
matic managerialism in the performative guise of legal
formalism.
This is possible only because as a genre of play,
technical problem-solving has much the same formal
features as formalistic legal reasoning. What the student
learns, in the course of problem-solving, is an appreciation
154. Id. at 68-77.
155. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, Recontextualization as Socialization: Text
and Pragmatics in the Law School Classroom, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF
DISCOURSE 229 (Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban eds., 1996) (suggesting that
this experience socializes students to a particular attitude towards text through
repeated acts of "decontextualization" and "recontextualization"); Edwin W.
Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and
Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 15 (1951) (describing the case method as a form
of "vicarious experience"); Riles, supra note 124, at 94.
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for the aesthetics of legal knowledge. How might doctrines
be accommodated and reconciled? How should the scope of a
statute be interpreted? What purchase is gained by re-
imagining a conflict among jurisdictions as a question of
statutory interpretation? If we define formalism not as an
epistemological or political position, but as an aesthetic
propensity, a genre of self-presentation, of engagement with
argument and text, 156 it is easy to see that this technical
aesthetic is by no means the exclusive province of legal
formalism.
In other words, this appreciation of the tools of law does
not mean that lawyers have abandoned their commitment
to the idea that legal tools are means to some greater social,
political or economic end, as the Realists and their progeny
often asserted for their critiques of legal formalists. Indeed,
if one were to ask any present-day American lawyer why
law is important, one no doubt would get an answer about
what law "does" or "accomplishes" in the world-an idea of
law as a tool, a means to an end, an instrument, rather
than an idea about form. Had lawyers abandoned this
instrumentalist commitment, what they love would by
definition no longer be a tool. But what the vignette above
suggests is that this does not stop lawyers from loving their
tools for their own sake, that is to say, from having a
certain aesthetic appreciation for their uses. What defines
the technical as a sphere of social practice, in other words,
is lawyers' commitments to an aesthetic of instrumentality,
not simply to an instrumentalist politics or project. It is a
complicated aesthetic, one that asks lawyers to turn inward
while it also gestures toward what is beyond the law, to the
question of what instruments are for.
We can see now how the literalization of the Realist
metaphor-the notion that law is an instrument or
machine-is an achievement or effect of the aesthetic
appreciation of legal form of the kind experienced in the
classroom episode I have described. The idea of state
interests becomes a tool for resolving Conflicts problems for
these students through our shared moment of appreciation
of technical form. Currie's achievement of turning an
ideology of instrumentality into an actual instrument for
156. See Annelise Riles, The Transnational Appeal of Formalism: The Case
of Japan's Netting Law (1999) (manuscript on file with the author).
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solving Conflicts problems works to the extent that it works
within lawyers' appreciation for an aesthetic of the
technical. The first lesson we can draw from the
ethnographic material I have presented is that in order for
managerialism to work, it must enlist our lawyerly aes-
thetic commitments.
Of course, this love of and commitment to the tools also
helps explain why it is that legal knowledge seems cut off
from the "social ends" it purports to instrumentalize, to
exist in what the legal theorist Gunther Teubner terms an"autopoetic" sphere of the technical 57 even as the stated
goal of means-ends reasoning is precisely to make law
relevant to real people, or real corporations, and their
problems. Once reframed as a problem-solving device, the
means-ends relationship serves to limit the scope of law, to
draw the device back in. The aim in this particular
hypothetical, the students quickly understand, is to restrict
the conflicting purposes a judge might have to entertain.
This aesthetic has a purposeful poverty of expressive
capacities, in other words; it is defined by the way it refuses
to signify. From this point of view, the "failure" of law's
expressive capacities is precisely the engine of its success. 158
And it is precisely this purposeful reductiveness of mid-
century Conflicts scholarship that has recently come under
attack as a kind of neo-formalism of its own.159 As
Brilmayer has argued, "the interest analysts have been
allowed to argue, in effect, 'Our method may seem short-
sighted and parochial, but it is not the courts' business to
second-guess a state legislature."' 16
0
157. Cf. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Anne
Bankowska & Ruth Adler trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993).
158. See RILES, supra note 141, at 20.
159. See Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent,
78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980).
160. Id. at 392; see also Gary Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the
United States: Notes on Rereading von Mehren, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 130-
32 (pointing out a number of practical and substantive problems with von
Mehren's proposal that courts craft new substantive rules in cases of conflict
over choice of law). At the same time, the lawyerly turn to treating Conflicts as
a subset of statutory interpretation has been revived and extended more
recently by Larry Kramer, who proposes resolving conflicts questions with
reference to a series of established "canons of interpretation." See Lawrence
Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277-345 (1990).
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It is on these aesthetic grounds, rather than because
the "modern approaches" could not decide cases, I want to
suggest, that Conflicts ultimately has been experienced by
its practitioners as in crisis. What has happened is that
Conflicts scholars have lost interest in devising new
solutions to their problems. Like a game that gets old when
it is played too many times, the plays have become
predictable. The technical vocabulary is a hermetic
vocabulary by design, but as Goffman suggested, in order
for such a vocabulary to succeed, it must always exist in a
kind of metaphorical dialogue with the world outside that
vocabulary. What differentiates Conflicts from other
subjects in this regard is precisely what first attracted the
Realists to the subject, namely the way it stands at one step
removed, so to speak, from the actual controversy. The
choice of law question is a prior question; it invites meta-
reflection on the methods of deciding cases, we might say. It
is first a subject about problems and solutions rather than a
set of substantive norms; it foregrounds the technical in a
more extreme way. Now that what was once implicit has
been made explicit, Conflicts as a subject is too explicitly,
too literally, too much about form.
V. CONCLUSION-TOWARDS THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LEGAL
TECHNOLOGY
The previous parts aimed to demonstrate, by way of
example, that those aspects of legal knowledge most often
set aside by humanistically-oriented legal scholars
nevertheless hold considerable theoretical interest and are
amenable to sophisticated analysis from a humanistic
perspective. The larger argument of the Essay is that it is
the mundane technocratic dimensions of law, precisely
those dimensions that fail to engage humanists' theoretical,
critical, or reformist passions, that are the most interesting
artifacts of lawyerly work. Hence it is time humanists take
on the technical dimension of legal knowledge as a cultural
practice of its own.
How should one study legal technology? I have offered
only one idiosyncratic example of how legal technologies
could be studied. No doubt there are many more. I would
urge, however, that the cultural study of legal technology
make a methodological commitment not to reduce technol-
ogy to the politics, culture, history, or personalities sur-
2005] 1029
CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW
rounding it-that we take the agency of technological form
seriously, as a subject on its own terms, as the legal
engineers among us do. The stylized account of one such
transformation of legal form I provided in Parts II, III and
IV was intended precisely to resist reducing this form to an
artifact of its historical, political, or social context and to
foreground instead the form itself, as a protagonist in its
own right.
And it is on this point, I believe, that we can find in the
work of Walter Wheeler Cook one model for our project. For
what is quite difficult to grasp, given the astounding
rhetorical success of Cook's revolution in Conflicts over the
last century, is that the instrumental uses of Cook's theory
to resolve cases just did not concern him terribly much. In
fact, Cook fought the conversion of his insights into legal
doctrines. When Judge Learned Hand adopted Cook's "local
law" theory as doctrine, rather than relish in what by any
standard was a major coup for his critique of vested
rights, 16 1 Cook expressed dissatisfaction at the fact that
Learned Hand had turned the theory into yet another
mechanical doctrine. The theory could not be turned into
hard doctrine in that way, Cook insisted, because the ends
of law were inherently as plural as the diversity of legal
contexts imaginable and hence could not be readily deduced
from the legislation.162
This was because there was something larger at stake
for Cook in this critique than a mere elucidation of the
logical flaws in Beale's argument or a proposal for how
better to oil the machine. The true achievement of Cook's
work, in his own mind, lay in making explicit the tacit
knowledge practices of lawyers and judges in all areas of
law. 163 In fact, Cook insisted that his work was not so much
161. See Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
162. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra
note 82, at 28.
163. See Cook, supra note 70, at 460:
In the present discussion it is proposed, instead of following the a
priori method, to adopt the procedure which has proved so fruitful in
other fields of science, viz., to observe concrete phenomena first and to
form generalizations afterwards. We shall therefore undertake to
formulate general statements as to what the "law" of a given country
"can" or "cannot" do in the way of attaching legal consequences to
situations and transactions by observing what has actually been done.
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about Conflicts per se as about the character of legal
knowledge more generally:
What has been attempted is a study in 'legal method,' i.e., an
analysis of some of the more common problems which present
themselves in this field with special reference to the intellectual
tools available for their solution. In order to accomplish this
purpose it has been necessary to outline what-for want of a better
term-may be called the author's 'philosophy of law.' By this phrase
is meant not only theories of the nature of law, of legal rights, and
of the judicial process, but also of such matters as the nature of
logic and the use of what we may call 'scientific method.'
1 64
The question of whether a case was a matter of tort or
contract was not an ontological question, therefore, but the
effect of the knowledge practices he sought to describe.
Cook's goal was not just internal critique, but a richer, more
nuanced account of the character of legal knowledge, a kind
of sociology of legal knowledge. In Cook's texts, legal
formalism is exceedingly carefully, even lovingly ob-
served:165
[I]n law as in the natural sciences, practice has preceded theory,
at least to a considerable extent, and conclusions have not actually
been reached purely deductively .... The actual process involved
in settling a situation of doubt-a 'new' case, if we are dealing with
law-involves a comparison of the data of the new situation with
the facts of a large number of prior situations which have been
subsumed under a 'rule' or 'principle' within the terms of which it is
thought the new situation may be brought. This comparison, if
carried on intelligently, necessarily involves a consideration of the
policy involved in the prior decisions and of the effects which those
Id.
164. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS supra
note 82, at ix. As Max Rheinstein put it in his review, "the author is not
concerned primarily with the conflict of laws. Rather, he has attacked the role
of logic in legal thought, and chosen the conflict of laws merely as a field of
illustration. The choice is apt, since faulty logic has had even more pernicious
results here than in other fields." Max Rheinstein, Methods of Legal Thought
and the Conflict of Laws: A Book Review, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 466 (1943)
(reviewing COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS,
supra note 82).
165. This sociological curiosity about the character of modern legal reason
was standard Realist fare. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 98; JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH
(1930).
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decisions have produced .... In doing this, the rule or principle as
it existed has not been merely 'applied'; it has been extended to
take in the new situation. In other words, however great the
appearance of purely deductive reasoning may be, the real decision
where a case presents novel elements consists in a redefining of the
middle term in the major and minor premises of the syllogism; that
is, of the construction or creation of premises for the case in hand,
which premises did not preexist. The statement of the premises of
the deductive syllogism is therefore a statement of the conclusion
which has been reached on other grounds, and not of the real
reason of the decision. When once the premises have been thus
constructed, the conclusion inevitably follows. 166
This focus on the actual practice of "doing" legal
knowledge is a critical move that would be familiar to the
authors of today's cultural studies of technoscience. 167 In
fact, Cook's subtle tracking of formalist logic in order to
demonstrate that it was in fact guided by pragmatic
considerations, including the availability, agency, and
limits of legal tools, 168 predates contemporary cultural
theory by more than half a century. In much the same way
STS scholars would do many decades later for the sciences,
Realist Conflicts scholars drew attention to the instruments
of legal reasoning-the intellectual tools of the lawyer, in
Cook's terms-the inner workings of syllogisms, the way
premises were constructed and then applied, the sleights of
hand entailed in the mere "application" of rules. Ultimately,
for Cook, however, the interesting questions in Conflicts
were not particular to law: "It may be useful to emphasize
166. Cook, supra note 70, at 487.
167. See LATOUR, supra note 84; PICKERING, supra note 42; LATOUR &
WOOLGAR, supra note 32.
168. Cf. Cheatham, supra note 67. Cheatham pointed out that the real
consequence of the vested rights theory was the agency the theory exercised
over its own interpretation:
The result of almost any case can be phrased in terms of any of the
theories (Realist or formalist), and it may be thought that the
differences between them are of no practical importance. But the
attitude of mind engendered by acceptance of one of the theories may
lead to practical consequences. The vivid language and conception of
vested rights would naturally tend to induce a court to follow precisely
the law of the place of occurrence or the law of some one technical
element of the occurrence, while other theories would tend to greater
freedom and flexibility in decision.
Id. at 392.
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once more that these difficulties in 'applying' a verbal
symbol to a new situation are not confined to the legal field,
but are common to all fields of thought."169 The footnotes to
his famous 1924 Conflicts article are full of citations to the
philosophy of science, to astronomy, and to physics 170 as
much as to legal texts. 171
I have sought to bring to the attention of legal scholars
some approaches from cognate humanistic disciplines-in
particular, Science and Technology Studies and the
Anthropology of Knowledge-that may hold promise in the
project of turning the technical dimensions of law into an
object of humanistic inquiry. My larger claim is that
ultimately, whether by these methods or others, humanists
must imagine approaches to the technical that are richer,
and more rhetorically effective, than traditional forms of
critique. Here we would do well to keep in mind that Cook
and his co-revolutionaries were studying not a distant past
or an exotic other, but a proximate present. Beale was very
much in their midst. The turn to the sociology of knowledge
was, in other words, also a critical move. One might even
say that the moment at which Cook succeeded in turning
Beale into an anthropological object was the moment at
which he defeated him. Following Cook, I want to suggest
that we can do something other than ignore or critique the
technocrats and the technologies in our midst: we can study
them.
169. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra
note 82, at 184.
170. See Cook, supra note 70, at 475 ("[W]e as lawyers, like the physical
scientists, are engaged in the study of objective physical phenomena. Instead of
the behavior of electrons, atoms or planets, however, we are dealing with the
behavior of human beings."); see also Cook, Characterization, supra note 71.
171. Of course, Cook's faith in scientism and of the possibility of analyzing
human relationships with the tools of mathematics and physics seems highly
dated from today's perspective. Cf. Simeon C.R. McIntosh, A Poetic for Law:
Constitutional Theory as Metaphor, 30 How. L.J. 355 (1987).
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